The crisis in the Socialist party by Foster, William Z.
University of Central Florida 
STARS 
PRISM: Political & Rights Issues & Social Movements 
1-1-1936 
The crisis in the Socialist party 
William Z. Foster 
Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/prism 
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu 
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in PRISM: Political 
& Rights Issues & Social Movements by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact 
STARS@ucf.edu. 
Recommended Citation 





C~APTER ONE: T ~ B  F&e of th SoCirolLt Pwty 
d #h Rumm Why 
s u m  war PomiIe, 4. m y  the %&at Parcg Failed, 9. 
CHAPTERTWO: A Gmtwsth  ~f R e f o m b  md Its 
DkrWprms Effects 
1. THE 8Ocum P k m  F ~ i t m  nr -WE WAas 
t f t k D B l f s E I l ~ ,  9. A. .hdVh' j  h StrikCl BDd 
-1% 
9. B. Contradictor). Ind-1 t7niom Policy, f 4. G hti-  
Labor Party Tendencys 13. a. Opportufht Trade Lfah 
N e u d i ,  15. 8. Oppxtunk war h l i q i  17. 8. 
k g  the R& kvoldon, 18.~1:. W a b c p  iit Clem % 
liibomh, 20. H. W a b t  Wty herdah 23, 
A W ~ d i n - ~  2*. 
" 0 j R a f d d  CHAPTER, T,HREE : A G- 
- Its D&#tyo#b E$U$..le'*bd) 
a. TWE prrm W a  -)Up W1M5 26, ! h o  
~WimgP0f ib .*-29* ~~~~ of tho 'XanaSartg 
&& $!.,=:?WI$ i&#$ 94 T h  IPi9,,8~& 51. h -;;30. ' 
cmymm porn: T k  P*& $h$h k P1 So- 
. &P P.w@ 
.- # drnbwb * I .  Pbtry- 
~:~ 4-2. ; 2:"F o w o P ~ J ) A u ~ M k l ~ ~ + 3  a PPttg Soetarian w e ,  44 
a t i ~ d h m e d h t e ~ 4 S , ~ T b  
Mom B e  47, a A Rauiomry W P d i q ,  
a. E. A 8tclatiaa h b r  Party Policy, 53. rP Thumd 
IMt.tiPn, 55. 
, 2. THE QV'E$TlON QF CIILT~VA'FINC THE m m A R V  
. F m  56, l€efo& Tbtoratical W a  563 a Ela&v Agpinst tba United Fmt, 60. C. unfwp Atti- 
tudo Towds tbt Soviet Union, 63. The w v e  of
the +hbt Party, 65. 
~ ~ L D  rn ImRtePl L I M Y  YHC. 
F. o. ~l) ] t  148, mh. 4 wxw ~ R S  cCm. Nw'UMq 1936 
CHAPTER ONE 
, 
The Failure of the Socialist Party and the 
- W H E N  the Sochlit Labor Party split in 1900-190 1, and gave 
bxth to the Socialist Party, this was a progreirsive development. 
The Socialist Lsbr Party, although some twenty-three yeam in the 
field, had not been able to root itself firmly among the American 
I 4 r n w .  It remained a skeleton organization of the foreign-barn, 
and its prop- and activities had little immediate relation to the lift 
of the native workers. The main cause of this was ita narrow 
, I sectarian policy, especially in the previous ten years under the leader- 
ship of Daniel Dc Leon. 
- In 1900, capitalism was undergoing a very rapid expansion. The 
- a . working class was also griming swiftly and its grievances and srrug- 
gles WEIE multigying. There was an urgent need for a better organi- 
zation of the workers' struggles, econornidy and phicnlly, in the 
light of a revolutionary goal for the working d9ss. In rhi sintation, 
breaking through the hard sectarian shell of the Sodalist Labor 
Party, the Socialist Party came into exisrence. 
Great hes were placed in the new orgmization by the bulk 
of the n v o l u ~  elements of the time. And during the oncoming 
years these rcvoluhnary foms put forth the moart intern# efforts to 
strengthen the party. Many thousands of workers made tbt building 
of the Socialise Party their He's work. struggled and fought 
for it, and prcpard llnd distributed of p r o p p & .  At times it 
lmked as though their'effatts would succeed, for the SDeialist Party 
p a d d y  grew in membership and intlutnee, It apptared that the 
American party would be able to progress as fast as the =idly growW 
ing Socialist Partks in other &dist wuntrks. 
But since the formation of the s o d k t  Party th'kty-five years 
have p e d ,  and what do we see? The Sodalist Partp, into which so 
much devoted work was put, b today small, stagnant and weak; in 
fact, is mually dedining hth in organizational strength and irrflucnce. 
In 1903, the Sacialist Party had 15,970 memhrs, and in 1935 it 
had 19,12 1 or just about the number it started with a generation 
before, and it is now rapidly ldng membership. The So&h Partg's 
vote in 1932 was 883,342, or less than the 897,O 1 1 which it polled 
in 1912. Twenv-five years ago the Party's trade union intluence a h  
was many times greater than it is at the present time. The Party has 
long since lost its &gle representative in Congr~ss, And so it is on 
all fronts: stagnation and decline. T o  cap the dimax, the Socialist 
Party $ now undergoing a nationaI split which has thrown the Party 
into confusion, is musing it a heavy 10s in m e m W p ,  and is gn- 
eraIly creating a critical situation. 
Obviously, the Socialist Party, l i e  the Sockfist Labor Party before 
it, has failed. That is the meaning of its present crisis. The Socialist 
Party has not been the means of winning the American masses 
ideologicalty for socialism nor of providing them with the necessary 
effectme politid organimtion. The reality of the failure of the So- 
d h t  Party is emphasized by the very existence of the Communist 
Party. It was only bemuse the Socialist Party did not function as an , 
effective revolutionarp organization of the American working d m  
that the Communist Parry came into being. I 
It is a perthenr question to ask why this miserable showing of 
the Socialist Party over so many years? Xs this the best that could 
have been done for socialism in the greatest caP;& countrg in the 
world? The workers have the right to a correct answer to thk 
question. No party can claim the sole right to carry the banner of 4 
mdalism unless it can effectively defend it. SeE4ticism is a cardinal 
Leninist h e  and the  Sadist Party has great need at present to I 
practice it. T h e  lesw,m m be learned should be helpful in bringing 1 
the S o d k t  Party out of its present serious crisis. ! I 
The customary explanation for the inahlility of the  S d i s t  Party 
to grow is that it was kcause of the great objective dfimlries in the 
United States that it had to contend with. Thcre is much merit in 
this contention; but as we shall see, it does not explain basidly the 
failure of the Socialist Partv. 
Among the b!g obje&e factors militating against the develop- 
ment of class consdousneas among the workers md the building of a 
revolutionary party in the United States were la) the odstence of 
. -  - 
plentiful government free land during several &erations;' (b) the 
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traditionally higher wage and f i g  standards; (c) the development 
of a large and consemtiye labor d s t o c r q  made up principally of 
Amerian-born workers; (d) the pmence of millions of Iow-paid 
disfranchkd immigrant workers of various nationalities, languages, 
religions and traditions; It) the passge of Iarge numbers of workers 
inta the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie and many even hto  the big 
bourgeoisie during the long period of i n d d  expnsion; ( f )  the 
existence of a relatively high degree of the formal democratic righs 
of free speech, free press, free assembly, to organize and strike, to 
be elected to any office, the fiction of legalized social equal*, etc., 
which were won by the toilers many years before in the early stages 
of the bourgeois revolution and which no longer served as major 
issues of immediate p o l i d  suvggte (as, for emmple, they did 
in Germany, Austria and otber European countries). 
These many economic, political and s a d  factors undoubtedly 
tended powerfully to blur cIass hes, to create bourgeois property 
illusions among the warkers, and to prevent their independent political 
orgahtion as a h. But they did not d e  the d m  struggle 
altogether. Far from it. The American working mmes bitterly 
resented the brutal and ferocious exploitation to which they were 
subjected, and they resolutely fought against it. This is amply &own 
by their long history of determined trade union smgglcs. Prior to 
the great war no country in the world excepc tsarist Russia had such 
a record of violent and fiercely fought strikes as the United States, 
The workers' strong cIass instinct and fighting trade union spirit were 
the raw material out of which a red revoluthnarp party could hhve 
been buk. Not as big a party perhaps as in some European coun- 
tries, yet certainly a strong, healthy, growing organization. But the 
Socialst Party proved glaringly incapable of educating these dh 
contented masses, of raising their struggle from the economic to the 
political sphere, and of building a strong party from their ranb. It is 
our task to learn the reasons why. 
When the Socialist P a q  broke through the crust of bidkt 
Labor Pariy sectarianism and took up its work of education and 
organidon it found indeed a very hard probhm before it; one more 
difiicult in fact than that faced by the k d h t  Prarry in any major 
capitalkc country. The working d w  in the grip of a tremendous 
rulimg dam propgaada, was thoroughly saturatesl with =pa'& 
~usions; the trade unions were already in the hands of the deeply I 
r e m * ~  k p e r s  clique; the great mass of workers were still 
tied to the two big capid& parties. Therefme, the most elementary 
work of enlightenment and organization stmi before the Party. 1 
In, this Wcult  .situation, in order to grow and to put itself af r 
the head of these backward mwsq dominated by nithless capitalist 
enemies, the Sockhit Party had boldly to d e  the great problems 'I 
of mas  eduation, organization and smggle confronting it. Ir had , 
to militantly wrest the leadership of the rn- out of the hands of 
the capitalists and their labor agents. It had to be a fighting party, a 
pq of dmt p r o l e h  class struggle. 
This meant that to develop such a policy of Marxian class strug- 
gle, the Socialist Party had to fulfil two major gad basic conditions: 
(1) to give active political leadership to the workers in their every- 
, day ftghm for immediate and burning economic and pIiticd de- 
mands; and (2) systematidly to educate its own membership and 
mass following in the principles of M a d  Socialism. Only in this 
manner could the Socialist Party come fornard as the real vangwdi 
of the workers in the class struggle and at the same h e  build ug 
a strong body of revalutionq fighters to serve as the very founda- 
tion and structure of the P q  and all i@ work 
The validity of such a policy of Mamian class struggle is demon- . 
strated by the whole hktory of the American labor movement. Nor - 
organization can makc headway against the powerful Amerim capi- 
talist class without an - h e ,  fighting plicy. For example, thc I 
trade unions have always grown most in their penbds of greatest 
militancy, and stagnated rnw in their p e r i d  of intensest b col- 
. laboration. Recent expressions of this truth were the rapid expamion 
af thc trade unions during the great strike wave of 1933-1 934, and, 
thc paralyzing decay that set in among them during the ptriod of 
widespread class .collaboration in the so-called good times from 
1923 to 1929. 
Another elementary proof of the effectiveness and correctness of 
the policy of class struggle is furnished by the growth of the Commu- 
nist Party in numbers and Mucnce. Although the Communist Prrrtg 
is only half as old as the Socialist Party it has about four times ss 
many members, It is also unified and hedthp, while the S d i s t  Party 
is torn with factionalism. The Communist Party, moreover, has had 
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to face far greater pccsecution &an was ever the msc with the So- 
cialist Party, exemplified by the Palmer Red raids in which thousands 
were arrested, wholesale txpulsions from the trade unions and indus- 
tries by reactionary American Federation of Labor Icaders, violent 
attach by the capitalist press, government d e p r m b n s ,  etc. The 
growth of the Communist Party in the face of these difficulties 59 to 
be ascribed to its brave and tirelcirs class struggle plicy. 
Still another demonstration of the correctntss of tbe daas struggle 
policy is provided by the hiswry of the Socialist Party itself. The best 
periods df growth of the &ist Pareg were dY thase in which 
its policies, hcauw of Left wing presure, took on more of a class 
smuggle character (thus 1907-19 121, and it was exactly during 
thm periods in which the Socialist Party plunged most deeply into 
dass collaboration (for example, 1923-1932) that the Party was 
weaka and least effective in the class m~~ld. 
From d this we are led directly to &; principal =use of the 
Socialkt Partp's failure historically. This Wure was mwd precisely 
by the fact that, except upon rare occasions, the S&t Party has 
not carried on a poliG of-&a struggie. O n  tbc contrary, its &a&- 
ti04 course has been one of opprtuism, of reformism, of elass 
collaboration. Throughout its history the Socialist Party has flagrantly 
violated the two fundamentals necessary to the development of the 
Marxian struggle policy required for the building of a revolu- 
tionary party in the given Amerian conditions, That is, ( I )  it has 
not come forward as the militant leader of the toiling m s  in 
heir daity struggle over urgent economic and politidcal&cs, but, 
insread, has systematically evaded assuming such leadership; (2) 
it has not gtriven to build up a strong body of revolutiarq Marxian 
understanding among the Party membership and mass following, 
but, on the contrary, has dtfiDittly hindered and checked the growth 
of such revolutionaq education. 
The reformist, opportunist policy which tiq Socialist Party has 
traditionalIy followed was the natural consequence of the composition 
of its decisive leading forces. From its inception, tbe !hi& Party 
attracted many elements of the city petty bourgeoisie who were 
feeling acutely the pPtesure of the trusts upon the middle dass and 
who had no faith in the two oId parties, but who in no sense were 
M d n  revoIutionaries. Hence the Party became infested with a 
horde of lawyers, doctors, preachers, professom, journalists, small 
busintswnen, with an oc-ond "millionaire" Socialist thrown in. 
And thq, extra-vocal and very energetic, soon arrived at complete 
domination over the P q .  
These people, the HIVquits, Bergers, Worh, Wallings, Sprga, 
R u d ,  Myers, Waylands, Simons, Harrimans, Bensons, Stokes, etc., 
etc., were not revolutionists. They were radicals, the Left wing of 
the petty bourgeoisie which was being crushed by monopoly capital 
and which had no party of its own. Over and above mere wordy 
aerencts  between them, the  decisive idea mimating them all was to 
build the So&t Party into a sort of progrekve-populist party. T o  
thh end they advocated opportunist policies of government and 
municipal ownership of industry and various minor legislative re- 
forms, with the general idea of some day transforming capitaJism 
into s o c ~  through a peaceful process of the workers voting 
tbemselves into power and then legally buying out the industries. 
The general conception of rhc ~ o l e ~ i a t ' s  role by these middle 
class elements was to serve as an instrument of the petty bourgeoisie 
in its fight for self-preservation against the advancing big capitalists. 
T o  them the struggle of the workers was eswntidy something 
foreign, something, at best, that they only had a dillttante interest in 
and which, at worst, was a danger to their vote-catching and c b  
cohhration schemes. C o v e n d y ,  the middle class, intellectual 
leaders of the Party throughout its history played down every 
manifestation of working class fighting spirit, And all the way along I 
through the y e m  they distorted or suppressed the teaching of Marx- 
ism to the Party membprs and following and used their own power 
to check the development of, and even to drive out of the Party in 
thousands, the very revolutionarp elements without whom the Party - 
auld not possibly be b d t ,  the Left wing af the Party. 
The general result of these long-.continued ref ormist, non-revo- , 
lutionary policies was to make it impomie to build the Socialist . 
Party product into f a such strong, a history revoIutiomq Es the presentday o ga hion. weak The and natural stagmt end- I ' 
Socialist Party. 
A Generation of Reformism and Its 
Disastrous Effects 
1 .  THE SOCIALIST PARTY'S FA~LURE TO ASSUME 
MASS LEADERSHIP 
OW let us look briefly at the record of the Socialist Party and see 
concretely h o w  it has prsistenrly and flagrantly viohted t h e  two 
main essentials of the Mandan class struggle policy necessary for 
the building of a revolutionary party in the specific American con- 
dition& namely, the development of the Party as the actual leader 
of the maws in the Jaily struggle and the cultivation of Marxian 
principles among the Party membership and mass following. W e  
will take up the former essentiaI first. Our summary of the So- 
cialist Party's experiences in this connection makes no pretense at 
being a complete hktory of the Party. AIl it does is to indicate some 
of the main opportunist errors of the Party and the lessons to be 
drawn from them. The period covered extends from the foundation 
of the Party in 1901 down to the Socialist Party convention of 
1934. As for the prtsent tendencies of the Socialist Party, I shaIl 
discuss them in a later chapter. 
A .  Passivity i Strikes a d  0th Stmggles 
When the Socialist Party was formed the trade unions were 
already in the hands of the Gompem machine. T h e  reactionary 
trade union le J e r s  did not carry on a campaign to organize the mass 
of the unorganized, but instead confined their efXorts chiefly to the 
narrow fringe of skilled workers. Many of these leaders were ~10th- 
ful, inefficient, self-seeking, corrupt, and tied up with all kinds of 
capitalist organizations. They were open ,defenders of the capitalist 
system, worked hand in glove with the two capitalist parties and 
generally acted as is brake upon the development of the workers' 
dass struggle. 
In such a situation it was maniftstly the task and duty of the 
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, b d k t  P~;zr to do everything within its p o ~ t  &&w and 
give Wd hdtrship to thc immcdiatc struggles of the worken, 
@c*ly on the trade union field. This dws not mean that the 
h i d k t  Party s h d d  bavt u n d u t h  to take the place of the trade 
d o n %  but it sbould have sought to invigorate them, to cxtend 
their strikes, to strcngthen their organization campigns and gen- 
e d y  to give practical leadership to their struggle, as against the 
reactionary policies of the Gompers madine. 
This aggressive policy offered a high road to e5ective mass leader- 
ship by the Party. But such a course was alien to the nature md 
policies of the Socialist Party pctty-bourgeois leaders. They neither 
saw the historic task before the Party nor had the impulse to carry 
it out. They conceived thc Party principally m be a propaganda organ- 
imjon, a movement to further their conceptions of public ownership 
and moderate legislative refwm, as welI as to conduct m c a s w d  
election campaigns. They did nat militantly lead the struggling 
. 
workers. 
Since its foundation, the Commuaist Party has shown how a 
party should give the l e d  to the trade unions and unorganized 
masses. Time and again it has m o b i k d  its organizer$ and fimdal I 
resources to support and strengthen trade union and other struggles. 
Many cwmpIes of this might be cited, such as the placing of some 
twenty paid argmkrs in the PMurgh area during the 1927 coal 
sailre; the maintenance of many organizers during various Labor 
Party campaigns; the extensive organization crews built up during 
the big unemployment struggle of 193041933, the financing of 
various united frunt conferenas, ctc. But this active and leading 
organization work was praca'calIy unknown to the p t q - b o u r g e k  
leaders of the Socialist Party. Where any such work was done it was 
almost always under the direct initiative of the Left wing. It is tru~ 
that  individual unions controlled by Socdists and also minorities of 
So- within van'cus organizaions outlined active orgsaization 
Earnpig= and strike work, but this was Iargcly spontaneous; the 
Party as a whole did not follow any such general policy. Its w n t i a l  
was that of a bystander, commentator and educational force, 
rh&er than the rnilirant, actual leader of the workers' daily struggle 
far their burning economic and politid demands. 
I 
~ll~mtia of thi s-list party psivity muld be cited, if 2 
space permitted, from many i m m t  S ~ L C  ~ g l e s ,  organ&- 
-'# 
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tion campaign$ etc., throughout the many years of the Party's 
existence. But the Socialist Party's attitude during the many great 
labor defense cases that came up from time to rime serves ta =em- 
plify its non-militant relation towards the class struggle. In the 
Moyer, Haywood and Pettibone case in 1907, the Left w i g  of 
the P a t j  gave active support, but the Right wing, instinctively sens- 
ing the militant revolutionist Haywood as an enemy, dotaged the 
fight. fn tbe McNamara of i 91 1, the S d a h t  Pany leaders, 
jointly with the American Federation of Labor, gave a certain s u p  
port, unnl these brave fighters, badly advised, pleaded guilty in an 
effort m save the trade unions and their leaders from pemt ion .  
Whvcupn the Socialist Party, like the American Federation of 
Labor, abandoned them wmpletely and bas never done a thing to 
help them since, although McNamara and Schmidt are stiIl in jail 
after twcntp-five years. h the Mooney-Billings and Sacco-Vanaetti 
ems of hter years, it was the Anarchins, Syndicah& Communists 
and Farmer-Labriots who t w k  the lead in the fight, with the 
Socialist Party tmdhg dong in the rear. And in the recent Swttsboro 
ease, it was the Communkt Party that leaped quickly to the defense 
of the condemned nine Neg-ro boys and by its swift action undoubt- 
edly saved them from electrocution, while the Socialist Party only 
joined the struggle in tbe later and then lamely a d  formally. 
This traditional passive attitude of the Sodalist Party towards the 
daily class struggle of the work- the andency to a after the 
masq  to preach at them rather than to stind milihntly at their 
head on every field of batde, cosr the Socialist Patty much @1e 
mass support and hdersbip. It was one of the major reasons why the 
%&&st P a q  never succeeded in d y  being accepted as the 
fighting party of the proletariat in this countiy. 
One of the great mistakes oJso of the kirrlist Party over many 
years was its opportw1iPr handling of the vital qudm of indumd 
unionism. Even before 1900 the more progressive elements among 
the worhrs r e h d  that the craft union4 because of sp?didon  
and d c ~ t i o n  i  industry, had become obsolete and that a system 
of i n d d  Lvlionism was imperatively necessary. AII sections of the 
r e v o l u t b q  movement became impregnated with industrial union 
sentiment, Witb the i m c  of i n d d  unionism was bound up the 
whole quation of the organidon of the unorganized, honest Iead- 
ership, m h t  policy, etc. 
It was the historic M of the Socialist Party to give dear dkec- 
tion and active leadership to the industrial union movement, but it 
failed dismally in this obligation. It is txve that the Party declared 
~ ~ ~ e g t u ' v d y  for the principle of industrial unionism. But it never 
told the workers dearly how to bring about industrid unionism, nor 
did it give unified leadership to the movement. The Party was di- 
vided for fifteen peas into two sections over this fundamental gues- 
principle of indusvial organization through amalgamation, but always 
ready to make aa opportunist maneuver on the question with the 
Gompcrs machine. On the other hand, the revolutionary Left wing 
tion. The Right wing worked mildly within the A. F. of L. for the - 
of the Party, oumged by the corrupt regime in the A. F. of L., di- ' 
rected its e h  in the main towards the realization of industrial 
unionism through the incorrect policy of building dual unions, that 
is, i n d d  unions independent of the A. F. of L. The ou-dhg 
ermmple of such dud industrial unions was the Industrial Workers of 
the World, which was launched in 1905. 
MdfestIy, in this situation, it was the definite responsibility of 
the Party to liquidate by educational means and firm direction this 
g h g  contradiction in policy within its ranks and to concentrah 
dt Party forces upon s milimt struggle within the trade unions for 
industrial unionism. But the petty-bourgeois Socialist Party leaders 
did not want an active fight for industrial unionism inside the A. 
F. of L., or ou&de either. They never wanted to fight the A. F. 
of L. leaders aggressively on basic issues. They were quite eontent 
to have the confused situation drag along as it W~S- So, over many 
years, they straddled the question, and the Right wing continued its 
opprtunist line in the A. F. of L., while the Left wing frittered 
away its strength in dual unfonmm. The typical opportunist policy on 
this vital issue wars expressed ia 191 2 when the Socialist Party con- 
vention endorsed the princ$c of industrial unionism hut did nat 
sate  whether this was to be brought to realization through the trans- 
I 
formation of the old wade unions, or by the building up of the 
I.W.W. and siimhr dual industrial unions. 
It was not until after the organization of the Communist Party 
-L in 1919, and especidly under the influence of the writing d Lenin 
on the quesdon of work within the old d t  unions, that the revo- 
I2 
lutionq movement in the United States liquidated its trdr hnal dual 
union tendencies and worked out o militant campign in the A. F. 
of It. for industriaI unionism, a campaign that tventually took or- 
ganized & a p  in the Trade Union Eduationd League. 
The general consequence of the Socialist Party's whole oppor- 
tunist handing of the ind&l union question vastly reduced the 
effectiveness of the Party's i n d d a l  union campsugn in general. The 
work of one wing of the Farq was antagonistic to that of the other, 
and because of this doubly wrong policy the Sodalist Pam as a whoIe 
lost i& opportunity to secwre real leadership of the masses on thk 
fundamental question. 
C. Anti-Ldor Party T e d -  
Another disastrous error of the Socialist Party ia prt-war days 
was its opposition in principle to the formation of the Labor Party. 
This wm a mistake also h e d  in by the Left wing, for ultra-Left 
reasons, It is a well-known facr that m those countries where, be- 
cause of specific national conditions, the trade unions were organized 
before the Socialist Parties took shape, the workem' first steps into 
independent political adon were in the form of organi~ing labor 
based directly on the trade unions. This was notably the c w  
in Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand. The United States 
belonged to thk category of countries. Here, because of factors already 
pointed out, the poiitid development of the workers had been de- 
layed; but they had succctdcd in building trade unions. The con- 
sequence was that when the workers began to feel the necrssity for 
organized class ditical a&n their natural tendency was to do as 
thi workers in Great Britain had done by developing a politid or- 
gaahation, a Labor Party, directly out of the unions. 
But the American Soddist Party leaders never understood this 
elementary fact. They resisted the n a m d  trend of the workers to 
form a Labor Party. They tried mechanically to apply to the United 
States a policy which was adapted to Germany, Austria and old 
Russia, where the Socialist Party, either growing before or simdm- 
neously with the trade unions, naturally became looked upon by the 
workers as the prty of the working c h  Thus, inatead of helping 
thc workers to take their first step in political am'on through r mass 
Labor Party, the S o & k  Party for many y c m  sought to kill thr 
Labor Party tendency by insisritlg upon the American workers ac- 
cepting the S o d k t  Party as their mass party. 
Instead of being its greatest champion as it should, the Socialist 
Party traditionally looked upon the Labor Party as a rival and fought 
I 
against it. Harry W. Laidler said: "The formation of these parties 
t [Id labor parties-W.Z.F.] in various pans of the country brought a new compttitor into the field against the Socialist Party."* Robert Hunter, the S.P.'s early expert: on the Labor Party, said the Social- is t  Party "is a Labor Party and all it needs is tbe united support of all American organizations".** He believed that to build a Labor 
Party apart from the Sachist Party would be "about as foolish a 
thing as ta scrap the machinerg of the A. F. of L. and to form a new 
trade union movements'.*** 
It was only in 192 1 when the Socialist Party, with hut a handfd 
of members and with its anti-Labor Party policy clearly bankrupt, 
f i d y  had to yield to the inevitable and endorsed ia principle the 
organization of a Labor Party. But it never became reconciled to 
this perspective, h refused to join with the Chicago Federation of 
L a b ,  the Communist Par9 and other Left organizations in 1923 
in a real* fight for the Labor Party. It has never ma& aa active cam- 
paign for the Labor Party. Even today it is passive upon this whole 
question and dl has the lingering feeling that the Labor Party is 
its rival. 
The S a d i s t  Party snd the working class paid high far this long 
continued anti-Labor Party tendenq. The Socialists' resistance to 
the naturally and spontaneously growing Labor Party definitelv hin- 
&red The + i t i d  development of the working d m  It checked the 
growth of the Labor Party sentiment in the trade unions. It made it 
e k  for the Gampers machine to keep the maws tied to the two 
old par&. Furthermore, with i~ wrong policy, the SocUkt Party 
gave up perhap the best weapon it ever had with which to fight the 
Gomptrs n a & A e  issue of the Labor Party. It was a s a d i c e  
that the opportunist leaders could easily make, however, in their 
, 
eagerness to be on good terms with the Gompers regime. The pn- 
wal consequence was that the Socialist Party badly failed to give 
lademhip to the workers in the vita question of the development 
-
* S o A J i m  is Z"A011gk d d+ p. MS. 
** Ihhr m Politics, p. 179. 
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of their mass political consciousness and organization, and the Socialist 
Parry itself as a result p i d  dearly in lm of potential membership 
and influence. 
Another disastrous reformist tendency that prevailed all through 
the life of the Socialist Party dawn to the advent of the present new 
leadership was the sa-caUed attitude of neutrality towards the tradc 
unions. I n  substance thk policy constituted a failure to put forward 
the Party policy militantly in the trade dons .  1t was a refud to 
take up the cudgels for the necesary active fight against the corrupt 
Gompers-Green leadcnhip to win the masses for S c d b .  W. J, 
Ghent, eqresing many Party decisions, difended this opportuni~ 
policy on the basis that the "Party does not seek to dictate to organized 
labor in matters of internal organization and policy". 
It is char that for Socialism to make, headway in the working 
c h ,  especially in the trade union movement, the Socialist Party had 
to come into head-on collisian with the reactionary trade union lead- 
ership. It was not a question of dictation to the unionq but of +ve 
assertion of the Party policy. But the doctors, lawyers, preachers, 
jourdst8, etc., who led tht Socialist Party, wanted no sueh fight. 
In many instances in the trade unions, the Left Pslrty elemedtp, 
notably such men as Duncan McDonald of the Illinoi miners, made 
a militant fight against Gornpers. But thip was not the true policy of 
the Party leadership. They wanted to cooperate with the Gompers- 
not fight them. Such a struggle as that made later over many 
years by the Trade Union Educational League or such a determined 
stand as that now being taken by John L. Lewis and the Cammitttt 
for Industrial Organization against the trade union bureaucracy, 
was quite foreign to the whole conception of thc opportunist S.P. 
Idem They seldom got beyond the smge d shadow-bonring with 
the reactiofiries. 
In fact, the S.P. leaders' real tendency was to mllaborate and 
amalgamate with h e  Gompers regime. If they did not actually con- 
solidate their forces with the Green ruling bureaucraq sooner, it 
was primarily because of the pressure of the large and militant Left 
wing in the Party. However, after the big split in 19 19 which took 
the whole Left wing out of the Party, the --bourgeois lader- 
Aip, with no Left mititants to restrain them, proceeded to drop all 
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o e n  to Gomperr and to identify thtmselvcs almost complcteIy 
with the reactionary d ing  trade union clique. Says D. J. Saposs, 
dealing with this period : 
' f T b  new &itid alignment of the k i d h  with the admin- 
h t m t i o ~  form marks the end of their leademhip in tbe opp&tion 
in the labor movement. T h q  have ahdoned the role of initiaton 
1 1 
of new ima for tht h b r  movement. They are no longer the center 
of m v c  oppoeitim. *! 
"In its political u c t i u i t : ~  the SoeinIist Party has followed a coarse 
similar to that of the Socialint tmde unionists Tt bas ceased attacking 
the conservative unimr and ladem* * 
This traditional policy of the Socialist Party leadership to tem- 
porize and compromise with the reactionary American Federation i 
of Labor officialdom was d k o u s  to the development of the Socid- 
ist Party as the re J leading force in the hbor movement. The only 
way the S o c W  Partg could have come. forward as the vanguard 
of the working h was by a policy of sustained militant struggle on 
aII fronb against the Gompers regime, and in this it failed dismally. 
In summing up the general situation during the pre-war period, 
it can be wfely said that if the Sa~ialist Parry had carried on a policy 
of c h  struggle, as indicated in the foregoing, it could have de- 
feated the Gompers regime and given the trade union movement a : 
Socialist lea&rship. In those days the Gompers machine was not SO 
deeply entrenched, trade union democracp was much more ~revalent, 
Red-baiting was not so e&&ve (for the reactionaries then only 
deemed the revolution pretty much as an abstraction), and a well- 
directed fight could have upset the old lcalrship. 
Even as it was, with a11 the wishy-washy opportunist policies of 
the Socislist Party, psdvity in strikes, organization campaigns Labor 
defense cases, etc. j its confused industrial union policy; its anti- a 
Labor Party program; its weak fight against Gompers, etc,, etc.,- 
the Socialist forces made distinct headway in the unions. In 1912 * 
they controlled such organizations as the brewery workers, bakery 
workers, shingle weavers, cap makers, ?inters, Western Federa- 
tion of Miners, machinists, fur workers, journeymen tadom, ladies 
garment workers, coal miners, etc. They also controlled many cen- 
tral Lbor unions and large numbers of local unions, as well as m g  ; 
*' 
minorities in the printers, cigar makers and almost every other labor 
organization. In the 1912 Ameriean Federation of Labor Conven- 
tion, the M i s t  candidate for Presidtnt, Hayes, polled 5,073 votes 
against Gompers' 1 1,974. A determined policy on the part of the 
Socialist Parry leademhip would have soon carried the majority of 
the trade union movement. But such n policy was not applied. And 
to make matters worse, the petty-bourgeois leadership of the Social- 
ist Party proceeded to mash comgettly the hhopes of the Socialist 
forces winning the trade union leadership by driving thousands 
of the best proletarian elements out of the Party during the big 
Party split of 19 12, of which I shall speak further dong, 
The World War prented a golden opportunity to the Sociakt 
Parrp to develop its strength and mas  leadership, but it fumbled 
the whole matter and faiIed to orgnize the masves effectively for 
anti-war struggk. There was undoubtedly a huge sentiment among 
the broad ranh of the people against America's entry into the war. 
This was demonstrated, among other things, by the election of 
WiLSDtt on his anti-intervention program, and a h  by the total im- 
mediate failure of the volunteer system to recruit sddiers for the 
war. Not only did the situation offer a splendid opportunity for mass 
anti-war work, but this was also the centraI revolutionary task 
of the time. 
But t h e  reformist-Ied S o d a h  Party proved incapbk of rising to 
the occasion. It did not develop a definite and well-organized mas 
struggle against the war. True enough, the Left wing, led by Deb 
and Ruthenberg, did succeed in putting the Party on record against 
the war and in d~veloping considerable anti-war agitation, even 
though this was somewhat of a +fist type and not yet a real 
Bolshevik anti-war policy aiming at transforming the war into a 
revolutionary struggle against capitalism. 
The Right wing, however, took an equivocal pit ian towards the 
war. Many of the petty-bourgeois leaders--Russell, Walling, Spargo, 
Simonq Stokes, Ghent, etc . jp l i t  away from the Party on a pra- 
' war program. The rest dillydallied with the question and, in effect, 
sabotaged the Party's anti-war resolution. So that there was no real 
c r y d k t i o n  of the Party's forces to mobilize the masses agaiast 
the war, no serious attempt to win the trade unions to an ant 
position, no organization of anti-war stnikes, etc. 
The general result was that, instead of making the  huge gains 
that it should have made, the Socialist Party, because of its vaciIlating, 
opportunist pliq on the war, only made a relatively moderate mem- 
bership increw in the war years, And this advance was more than 
offset by a disastrous sharpening of the struggle betwecn the Right 
and Left wings in the Party over the reformist leadership's oppor- 
tunist war-time policies, and also by serious lows of position and 
control in the trade unions. During the war the Sociaiist Party p i d  
heavily for its Iong years of wrong trade union policy. Because the 
Swidist Party had not entrenched iwIf in the unions in former times 
by a rn%tant'smggle based on sound principles, the Gomperrr dique 
was in firm command at the crucial moment and was able to use its 
oflicid control with t e h g  effect to swing the trade unions to a pro- 
war position. Thus it largely isohted the  Socialist Party and crippled 
the whole zmti-war struggle. The  Socialist Party reformist leaders 
muffed the war situation almost completely. What should have re- 
sulted in a great victory of the Party they eventually turned into a 
serious defeat. 
A deadly, disastrous sin of the reformist petty-bourgeois leader- 
ship of the Socialist Party against the working class and the Socialist 
Party was its hostile attitude towards the Bolshevik Rwian revolu- 
tion. Perhaps nothing in the whole history of the Socialist Party did 
more to destroy that Party's internd unity, prevent its growth, and 
kil! its mass influence than the bitter warfare that the profewrs, 
preachers, lawyers, and similar non-proletarian elements running 
ernment. 
1 
the Socklist Party directed for many years against the Soviet gov- r 
S The advent of the October Revolution presented an unequaled - 
opportunity for the Socialist Party to educate and organize the masses. :1 
Here, at  last, was the muchdreamt-of, l o n g - p h e d  socialism come ' 
into being after a glorious victory over Russian tsarism and capi- 
talism. The revolution taught a rhousand vital lessons in proIetarian 
theory, strategy and tactics; the heroism of its fighters was an 
inspiration to the toiling masses of the world; it gave the first red 
ray of hope to the opprewd in a11 countries. What a tremendous 
o p p o d q  for the Socialist Party to b d d  itself by wing this great 
world-shaking event for the furtherance of the Socialist cause in the 
Unired Smtcs! And together with this immense propaganda value 
of the Russian revolution. to the SociaLmt Party there was also the 
duty-bound revolutior.ary task upon the shoulders of the Socialist 
Parry to u4e dl its power to organize the masw to defend the 
newly-formed Soviet government, attacked on dl sides as it was by 
capitalist forces. 
Durhg all the years of its existence it has been one of the 
Wongesc factors in the growth of the Communist Party that it has 
fully understood the revolutionary signifiance of the Soviet govern- 
ment and thoroughly appreciated the ppportunities and revolutionary 
dudes connected therewith. But not so the S o d k t  Pafty. Its petty- 
I bourgeois leaders were not revolutionists. They did not want to 
destroy capitalism, bu! to reform it. The Russian revolution was a 
thing alien and hostile to them. The overthrow of cam in 
Ru d a  in Octokr, 191 7, was against their plan of gradually trans- 
forming society from capidism to sociaIism. So, instead of supporting 
the Soviet government as all true revolutionists must, they viewed it 
with hatred and spared no words in denouncing it. And all this was 
the antagonistic position assumed towards the Soviets 
the Second IntemationaI. 
Throughout the Iife of the Russian revolution, the American 
&cialist press has reeked with anti-Soviet attacks, even though the 
Socialist Party bas grudgingly endorsed the Soviet government be- 
muse of mas  pressure. Hillquit clearly expressed the general attitude 
of his co-middle class leaden when he declared, in a spirit of thorough 
"The Soviet government bas been the greatat ddisapter and calam- 
ity that bas ever occurred to the Swialist movement. Let us dimdate 
o ~ 1 v e ~  from the Soviet * 
Every dander against the U.S.S.R. sent forth by bourgeois ent- 
mies was picked up, repeated and enlarged upon in the Socidist press. 
The Party leaders accused the Soviet government of "Red impe- 
rialism", of starving u d  oppressing the masses, of betraying the 
SdaM a w e .  Norman Thomas, characteristidy, added hi voice 
to thc deplorable antiSoviet chorus when he said: 
thing, however, h certaini the Rtdan govemmmt rulw 
by ~y and terror, with policu, espionage ptld arbitrary 
cxecubom." * 
Gommm WoU and Green did not outdo the W i s t  leaders 
in vicio& aG-soviet attacks. And as for Hearst, he copied many of 
his worst hndem from the columns of the Jewish S d s t  POFWW~. 
The Socialist Party herokd the Menshevik counter-revolutionary 
Abramovicb when he came to the United States, and thc Imutgcois 
world applauded the shameful spemdt of Hillquit, Icader of the 
Sodalist Party, acting as attorney for former Rush capitalist oil 
interests in the American mum in an effort to force the Soviet 
gwernment to return their confiscated property. 
Of alI the non-revoIutionarg policies in the history of the So- 
cialist Party petty-bourgeois leaden their anti-Soviet line was the 
worst md most d#rvuctivt to the health, growth and mass leader- 
ship of the Socialist Party. It was the poison fruit of many years of 
reformism in all its putrid rotteaneas, It worked profoundly to un- 
dermine the htcgritp of the $ock&t Party, to aXjcnatc from it the 
best fighting elements in the working c l m  and to weaken its rnm 
in&cnct generally. This enmity towards the U.S.S.R. had a power- 
ful effect in driving still deeper the wedge separating the Socialist 
and Communist Parties, Altogether it was a decisive factor in r e  
ducing the Sodist: Party to the impotency which it has suffered in 
the past fifteen years. The anticSoviet policy of the Soedist Party 
leaders was an aid and comfort to the mitalist enemies of the rev* 
lutioni and it &owed condusiwly that &ise pettyhurgeois oppor- 
runkits never could build the So&t Party into a powerful 
revolutionary mass party. 
G. N e d  Dm$ in C h s  C O Z ~ ~ W I F ~  
After the World War the American big capitalists initiated their 
notorious movement far speeding up the workers. It was the period 
of the great rationalidon of industry. New methods of driving the 
workers were introduced m dl sidcs and the toilers' productivity 
increased. T o  stcurt some pretense of consent of the workers 
to the inhuman sspeed-up, all sorts of welfare system% bonus plans, 
old age pensions, and the like were established. Beaides this, illusiaas 
were intensively cultivated far and wide among the workers by 
Carver, Gillette, and many others to the e%ect that through thc 
new-fangled employee stock-ownedip p h s  they werc actudy 
buying control of the industries and were on thc highroad to same 
sort of colIectivc commanweafth. This speed-up movement raged 
nearly dl through the Coolidge prosperity period, from about 1922 
to 1929. It spread in the unorg~~1iztd as well as e d  industries. 
It vastly increased the exploibtion af the workers and brought fresh 
billions into the coffers of the money-drunk cqnkdists. 
The top A. F. of L. leaden, true to their reactionary role, fitted 
thcmselvts into this whole speed-up program. They declared that 
strikes and the c h  srmggIe were o b k t e  and that the way of the 
workers to prosperity now Isy through cooperation with the bwses 
to increase produciion--of which the workers werc somehow to get 
an increased ahare. The A. F. of L. leaders adopted the whole 
speed-up system under the euphonious phrases of the "new wage 
plan" and the "higher strategy of labr''. They hired efficiency I engineers for the unions and srt up the B. & 0. plan and other fornu 
of 'hnion-management cooperation" to apply the b-a speed-up. 
As P result of this monstrous clas collaboration policy the A. F. of 
L. leaders reduced the unions to a semi-compy union status, to 
mere appendages of rhe employers' production schemes. The workers' 
hard-won worfig condttions were ruthldy  sacrificed. In con- 
sequence, the unions declined steadily in membership and fighting 
spirit, For the first time in historg they did not grow during a period 
of ecanomic expansion. The whole trade union movement was 
afflicted wih  dry rot. 
As befitted revolutionary organizations, the Communist Party 
and Trade Union Educational League fought uncompromisingly 
against this whole speed-up development. The Communists raised 
the question in every trade union. They denounced the B. & 0. plan 
as disastrous to the trade unions and the interests of the worke~; 
they expwed the many ilZusi011s that were beiag built up around em- 
&yee-sto&buying, Lbor banking, etc.; they demanded a fighting, 
cIass -gale policy. And in making this fight the Commuths had 
to face whotesale expulsion and discharge from industry and labor 
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unions all over the country; for the combined employers and reac- 
tionary trade union leaders proceeded to extremts to break up all 
opposition to their class collaboration program. Never in the history 
of the American labor movement was trade union. democracy at 
such a low ebb. The brave fight it made in these times was one of the 
best pages of the life of the Communist Party, 
How did the Socialist Party meet its revolutionary duty in rhis 
rritical situation, when the masses needed correct leadership so 
acutely? As usual, it did not rist to the occasian. O n  the contrary, 
the S d i s t  trade union leaders everywhere i4entificd themselves 
almost completely with the Green leadership. This was the period 
cited by S a p s  above when the S.P. leaders ceased to k the trade 
union opposition. They became ardent supprters and theorizers at 
the "new wage @cy" and the "higher strategy of labor". They con- I I
demned strikes as entirely out of date. In no industry did class col- 
labration reach greater heights than in the Smialist-controlled 
needle trades. And nowhere was the expulsion policy so ruthlcsdy 
applied against the militant Left-wing elements wha were fighting 
to keep the trade unions from being used as tools ta increw the 
exploiration of the working dm. 
The Socialist Party made no tight whatever against the infamous 
3. & 0. plan, union management cooperation, the "new wage pol- 
icy", and dl the rest of it. TI& is not suprising# because the whole 
Second International had become greatly cn&uscd over the speed-up 
movement, helped the bosses to introduce it in E q ,  and hailed it 
as the broad way to socdim. Spbhg fancy rheories about an 
"oqpized capital;sm", "supef-imperialh", and a long priad of 
peaceful mpitalk expansion ahead, they outdid even the hectic 1 
American capitalist theorists of the rationalization of industry 
movement. 
In 1925, when the Communist Party was fighting against unian- 
management cooperation throughout the trade union movement, 
Norman Thomas, in his booklet, W h  Is I d w M  Dmwwa6y ?, 
gave his bIessing to &the notorious B. t 0. speed-up plan in the 
iollowing words: 
. . the mihad managemmt in return for improved stand& 
of shop p d u &  t doing im otmm to keep the men supplied with 
work w that the men gain, not h, by &&q. Thc plan s e a u  
to he working well. . . ." 
The Amerkan Socialist Parry naturalIy suffered severely from 
its d i n g  after the bourgeoisie in &is situation. It became afflicted 
with the dry rot that had infected the trade union movement gen- 
erally, except that the Socidist Party got it worse. The Party sank 
to the lowest stage in all its career, both ideologicdy and organiza- 
tionally. By 1929 it had remaining only about 7,500 membets, and 
its revolutionary spirit had dropped to correspdhgIy low levels. 
This was the generaily unlovely period of the Party's support to 
LaFolIette's candidacy, the removal of the class struggle dam 
from the Socialist Party membership application card, the agitation 
of Norman Thomas to change the name of the Party, etc. In short, 
the Socialist Party was on the very brink of bankruptcy, The Parry 
was harvesting ' in full the bitter crop of its many Inng years of 
opportunist petty-burgeois leadership. 
When the great economic crash came in 1929 the employers, 
with the Hoover government their willing t d ,  proceeded to dash 
the wages of the employed and to force the millions of unemployed 
to starve. It is a notorious fact that the A. F, of t leaders to& 
no real action against this brutaI course. On the contrary, they oh- 
jectivcly aided the employers by viciously fighting against unem- 
ployment insurance and in support of Hoover" sbgger system, and 
by signing the infamous Hmver nwtrike-n+wagt-cut agreement 
which enabled the bosses freely to dash wages. And for all this 
they were duly praised by the -pitalist press. 
The Communist Party, on the other hand, militantly took up 
the fight for the employed and unemployed workers. Beginning with 
the famous March 6, 1930, national demonstration of 1,250,000 
unemployed, it carried on during the next three years a most ag- 
gressive struggle for and with the unemployed all over the country. 
It organized hundreds of local and state mass hunger marches and 
other demonstrations. It carried out several national conventions and 
marches on Washington. During these bitter fights the Communist 
Party and its following faced violent attacks from the police; hun- 
dreds were clubbed and jailed and many were killed in the dtmon- 
~mntions. The generd effect of this big mass struggle under the 
Communist P q  leadership was to make unemptopent *ante 
and relief red m t s  in thi country and to force many important 
relief can&ns from the employem. It also hid a strong founda- 
tion for the Communist Party among the masses. 
And what was the Sadist Party doing in these crucial early 
years of the crisis? Practically nothing to organize the unemployed 
masses for struggle, It was still par111yzed from its f m e r  orgy of 
c k  c o ~ b o t i o n .  While the Communist Party was on the firing 
line with huge demonstrations and other struggles, we find Norman 
Thomas and J. P. Morgan jointly suprthg over the radio the 
useless block-aid qstem. The Socialist Party) it is true, talked a great 
deal in these years of unemployment relief and insurance, but it did 
not go out and fight for them. It was only after the Cornmuid 
Party had long taken the lead in the smgglc, and c s p t d y  after 
new Left elements began to develop in the Socialist Party, that that 
Party slowly started to play a role in the strugglc of the unemployed. 
When the great strike movement began under RooseveTt7s regime 
early in 1933, again the Socialist Party could not rise to the situation 
and give the awakening masses effective leadership. Manifestly, it 
was the ~ of every revolutionary orginization to do dl pd'blc 
(as the CommuniPt Party did) to stimulate and lead the employed 
workers in tl& the first red attack thy  had made against their 
oppressors for a dozen yeam But the Socialist Party was incapabk 
of giving such aggressive leadership. Instead, ia leader Norman 
Thmas, who in 1932 bold complained of the "docility of labor" 
and who was now filled with i U k  about Rmstvelt's ''&aku", 
m U y  tried to put a damper on the struggle by telling tbe worlrtrs 
that "strilw are inadvisable at the present the".* But the workers 
paid no attention to Thomas' oppommism, no more than they did 
to the similar advice of William Green; but went &tly ahead 
with the development of their enormous gtrike movement. Thus, 
once more, the Sodalist Party) moved by reformist eonsiderations, 
dillY-d&d witb a crucial situation and failed to give the masscs the 
ne-ry class struggle leaderithip. 
In this section I have shown that historidly the Sodalift Party 
bas consistently viohted the first fundamental of the daPs struggle 
- 
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policp: namely, the newssity of coming forward aggressively as the 
champion of the masses in their daily figha for urgent economic and 
political demands. Instead of fulfilling this imperative necessity, the 
whole history of the Socialist Party is an abdication of such mas 
leadership. T h e  illustrations Jted: the Socialist Party's traditionally 
passive attitude towards strikes and organization campaigns; its 
long-continued contradictory industrid union policy; its anti-Labor 
Party tendency; iw opportunist policy of neutrality towards the 
trade unions; its failure ditantly to fight the Gompers-Green 
bureaucracy; i~ wavering pIicy during the war; its hastilitg to the 
Soviet government; its failure to fight the deadly union-management 
cooperation speed-up movemex~t ; and its lethargy in the struggIes 
of the unemplqed and employed workers during the early years of 
the present industrial c-all these wrong ~ l i c i e s  together amply 
prove the point that the Socialist Party has failed to give a fighting 
leadership to the toilers in their situations of deepest need. And to 
these illustrations others wdd be added as, for example, the So- 
cialist Paw's complete neglect of the burning Negro question over 
many year4 its opportunistic handling of the youth kue, its haphazard 
cmsideration of the problems of women, the foreign-born, etc. 
The general result of the Socialist Party's traditional flabby, 
reformist, class-coUrborationmt policies, dictated by its opportunist 
middle dass leadership, has been that the Soc'dist Paw could not 
and did nat become a strong, mass revolu&nary Party. Its leaders 
ducked and evaded and compromised every struggle and h e  that 
the workers were basically interested in. By its weak, opportunist 
course, the Socialist Party was unable to defeat its powerful capi- 
talist enemies and their labor leader hkhmen .  Hence it did not 
secure the leadershiu of the masses and become their accepted revo- 
lutionary party. ~ i e r e  couId be no other outcome of ke Socialist 
P q ' s  long record of opportunist vacillations and abdication of 
leadership in the dass struggle than the Party's present crisis and 
obvious failure. 
CHAPTER THREE 
A Generation of Reformism and Its 
Disashous Effects (Continued) 
I 2. THE WAR ACAMST THE LEFT WING 
IN ANALYZING the basic reason for the histo&d hilure of the 
Socialist Party-which was its lack of a Mafxl'an policy of class 
struggle--let us now consider bried y the Socialist Party's experience 
with the second element going to make up such a policy of dass 
struggle, i-c., the nectssiry of hying a firm foundation for the So- 
cialist Party by the cultivation of a strong body of revolutions y 
Mamian understanding in the Party membership and among its mass 
following. In doing this we shall see that the opportunist Socialist 
Party leaders haw violated this fundamental no less deeply and con- 
sistently than they did the other imperative essentiaI of a dass struggle 
policy (which we have previously discussed), that of giving effective 
leadership to the masses in their daily struggles, and with equally 
diwtrous result+. 
It was obviously an indispensable first condition for the succes of 
the Socdist Party that it systematically educate the broadest possible 
ranks of Marxian revo~utionipts. Such revoIutionmts furnish the 
rimy understanding of the capitalist system, they are the tire- 
I e s  organizers of the mas- the bravest fighters in every crisis, the 
indefatigable builders of the Party, the heart and brain of the c h  
struggle. T o  try to build a revolutionary Socialist Party without 
deveIoping the Marxian understanding of its membership is to at- 
tempt the classically impib le  task of making bricks without straw. 
This would seem to be a pretty self-evident fact, hut the Socialist 
Party has grossly ignored it throughout its existence. The Right wing 
petty-bourgeois intellectuals controlling the Socialist Party, instead of 
carefully cultivating the life-giving revolutionary tendency, looked 
upon it as a hatile f orcc, and they spared no efforts to check it, to 
repress it, to extinguish it, indeed to burn it out of the Party. This 
action on their part was logical enough as they had no intentibn what- 
ever of making the Socialist Party a revolutionary party, h this 
ruthless war against the Left wing, continued for a generation, is to 
be found a fundamend reason for the failure of the Socialist 
Party and for its present critical condition. 
Before describing this war against the Left wing it will be well 
briefly to a n a l p  h e  Socialist Party groups. The Right wing, which 
dominated the Socialist Partp from its organization down to the 
present year, was, during the heyday of the Party, made up of several 
group Chiefly these were: 
A. The extreme Right, roughly, the Bernstein revisionist ten- 
dency, was composed of a miscellaneous group of lawyers, doctors, 
preachers, etc., sum& as Hamiman, Bergcr, Cahan, Stokes, Wilson, 
Mih, Hoan, Laidler, ud d. Previously, I have indicated the general 
reformist tendency of this grounovernmtnt ownership, municipal 
socialism, parliamentary reform, anti class struggle, etc. 
3, The agrarian group, also of extreme Right tendency, was 
strong in the farming districts of Oklahoma, Kansas, Texas, 
Wfashington, etc. It was a remnant from the breakup of the old 
Populist movement and it generally supported the line of the Right 
wing intellectuals, with the addition of its cheapmoney vagaries and 
a particularly utopian slant to its "Socialism". This tendency cry* 
talliztd chiefly around such papers as Wayhd's  Coming No&, 
dppad to Reason and Arkansas Ripsaw. 
C .  The trade union group was compowd of labor officials, Iikt 
Van Lear and Johnston (Machinis&), Walker, Germer and Hayes 
(Miners), Hayes (Printers), Barnes (Cigarma ken), Maurer 
(Plumbers), Sfremp (Painters), SchIe~inger (I.L.G.W.U,), etc. 
In general this opprrunh group also followed the lead of the 
Right wing intellectuals, except that they placed more stress upon 
trade union questions. 
D. The soccalled center or Kautsky tendency was composed 
mainly of petty-bourgeois intellectuals. It included Hillquit, 
Simons, Oneal, Lee, etc. These people were sticklers for Mam*an 
p h r a c  if not for Ma& deeds. This group gave the Sociali i  
P a y  its dominant leader for 34 ycars, Morris Hillquit, 
Historically these four reformist group functioned unitedly as 
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the Right wing of the Socialist Party, especially in the war igahst 
the Left wing, and they had the hdcing chiefly of the non-prole- 
tarians and the skilled worker members of the Party. It is true that 
the Hillquit center group kept up a running quarrel for years with 
the raw opportunism of the extreme Right "*office socialism" 
eiemenrs. But this fight was superficial and did not conflict with the 
basically ref ormist line of the Party. The onIy serious difierences that 
developed within the broad Right wing were during the war when 
the pro-war Sprgo, Stokes, Walling, ct d, quit the Party. After 
the national split of 1919 the four Right group, or what was still left 
of them, gradually coalwccd and became pra-y indistinguishable 
from each other in one crassly opportunist old g w d  leadership. 
The Left wing of the Socialist Party was more homogeneous 
than the R i h t  wing. It was made up almost entirely of prolarians, 
chiefly unskilled and immigrant workers, with an occasional revdu- 
tionary intellectul Through its twenty years of history within the 
S o & k  Party it was led by such figure3 as Hagertp, Trautmaan, 
Titus, Marcy, Haywood and Ruthenberg. Deb was usually a mili- 
tant spokesman of the Left wing program, but he took no active 
part in &aping Party policy in conventions, tte. He never idenrified 
himself with the Left in its or+d struggles against the Right, nor 
did he become involved in any of the various Party splits. 
The Left wing took flat k u e  with the whole reformist line of 
the dominant Right wing intellectual leadership. Basing itself upon 
the fundamentals of Mam and Engels, it fought to give the  Socialist 
Party a program and policy of revoIutionary clam struggle. It op 
postd the current opportunist theories of the paceful taking over 
of the government and the plan af buying up the industries, and it 
placed in opposition to them the Marxian perspective of the over- 
throw of capitalism by open struggle and the expropriation of the 
cxprophtors without compensation. It condemned the Socialist 
Party leaders' passivity in the daily cIass struggle and their dass 
collaboration policies and compromks with Gompersism. It demand- 
ed r program of active struggle against the employers and war to 
the knife against the capitalist-minded leaders of the trade unions. 
Although the LRfr wing was the revolutionary element within 
the Party, it nntvertbeles suffered from many and seriotvs theoretid 
and practical weaknes, arising mainly out of its inexperience and 
idedogid unripenesa These errors in general tended in the diredon 
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af "Left" sectarianism. They were largely a heritage from De 
Leanism, and were usually semi-Syndicalist in character, Among 
the more important of these Left wing errors were (1) Confusion 
regarding the nature of the revoIutionsry role of the Party, with 
tendencies to make the industrial unions the leading fighting force 
of the proletariat; (2) Wrong theories of the composition of the 
future dictatotship of the proletariat, with tendencies towards the 
Syndicalist trade union state; (3) Underestimation of the resistance 
power of caphlism and theorics of accomplishing the revolution bp 
the faldcd-ms general strike ; (4) Underestimation of the struggle 
for immediate pohtiml demands and tendencies towards anti-par- 
Iiamcntaism ; (5)  Neglect of work within the mass trade unions and 
a utopian belief in dual industrial unionism; (6) Underestimation 
of the importance of the farming, Negro and lower petty-bourgeois 
masses as united front allies of the proletariat. Further secrarian ten- 
dencies were: against the Labor Party in principle; overstress upon 
the religious question, and the ignoring and flouting of American 
traditions and culture. 
Thew various theoretical and practical errors of the Left wing 
worked greatly to hrrld back the prcgress of the Party. They tended 
to break its contacts with the masses and to push the Party into 
sectarian isolation. And, added to this, they handicapped the fight 
against the Right wing, for Right opportunism cannot be defeated 
with "Left " sectarianism, But the overwhelming responsibility for 
the failure of the Socialist Party is to be found in the rank oppor- 
tunism of the dominant ppty-bourgeois leadership, and not in the 
weakness of the Left. Despite its many errors the Left wing was 
basically correct in its striving for a chss struggle policy, It was the 
healthy Party core, and only through the correction of its short- 
comings and the development of its general program of clm struggk 
was ir p i l e  to build the Socialist Party into a revolutionary party. 
It must be added, however, that the political line of the Right 
wing in no sense served to correct the errors of the Left wing. 
Xts tendency was to drag the Party off in another direction, to the 
swamp of Right oppommism. 
The Iongqontinued struggle between the Right and Left wings, 
the highlights of which I shall now proceed to relate, placed the 
issue squarely: s h d  the Socialist Parry be a party of petty-bourgeois 
reform or of proletarian class struggle? The cleavage was funda- 
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mental and the protracted fight took on the character of class struggle 
wirhin the Party. So that during the various spljts in many local 
branches the line of division ~d dmmt exactly between the 
proletarians and non-proletarians, the working dass elements going 
with the Left wing out of the Party. That the %list Party failed ' to become a revolutionary prry is primarily an exp-ion of the  fact 
that the Left wing was defeated in its struggle for control of the 
Pary and v~ a s  compelled to build a new, revolutionary organization, 
the Communist Party. 
EwZy Phases of the I--Pwty Smggle 
Hardy had the Socialkt Party come into ucistenct in 1901 as a 
result of the historically justified split away from the deadly sectarian- 
ism of the %list Labor P a m  than the fatal contrd of the re- 
formist lawyers, doctors, preachers, journalists, ete., asserted itself. 
And, likewig, as the corrective to thew baneful elements and ten- 
dencies, the revolutionary Left wing of the Party slowly began to 
take shape and to voice its program. With the passage of the years 
the cleavage between the Right and Lc f t wings of the Party b e m e  
more pmnounced, until finally the hevitaMc complete break came. 
The first sharp division in the Party on a major scale occurred 
in 1905 over the question of industrial unionism whicb, then as now, 
was bound up with the whole question of militant trade mion 
policies. The Left wing, repelled by the reactionary leadership and 
program of the A. F. of L., was for establishing new and inde- 
pendent revolutionary industrial unions, and the Right wing, opposed 
to fighting policies generally, was against it. Under the leadtrship 
of Debs, Haywood and De Leon (Socialist Labor P q )  the In- 
dustrial Workers of the World w s  f lormed in Chicago in 1905. In 
his autobiograph J Haywood note8 the division between Right and 
Left over the I.W.W. convention, stating that "None of the poli- 
t i c k s  of the Socialist Party, such as Berger, Hillquit, Spargo or 
Hayes, took partm.* 
The factional struggle scron spread from the question of in- 
dwtrial unionism to many phases of the Parry's theory and practice. 
The ptriod in question was one of growing working dass organiza- 
tion and dass consciousn~ under the fierce pressure of expanding 
American capitdim. It was a time sf many bitter strikes, of which 
the-blowly Chiago ecamstcrs' strike of 1905, with 21 killed and 451 
wounded, was an example. Since 1898 the A. F. of 1;. had increased 
its membership from 270,000 to 1,550,000. The Socialist Party 
also reflected this rising tide of working class militancy, its me& 
bership increasing from some 12,000 in 1901 to 41,479 in 1909 
wxld its inff uence rapidly growing in the trade unions. 
The Left wing demand for a c h  struggle policy by the Party i bc-c stronger and stronger nnd new Left Ladcrr dcvelopd. In- 
creasingly the clash grew between the revolutionary elements and 
I the pettg-bourgeois leadership. The former wanted to make the 
Party into a red fighting instrumtnt of the working class, the latter 
wanted to follow s policy of reformism and compromise, Tension was 
acute, especially in several states in the Far West, where the kst or- 
ganized and most revolutionary sections of the Party were located. 
The first serious split occurred in the Pacific Northwest early in 1909. 
The split took p k e  in Everett, Washington. The leader of the 
Lefts was Dr. H. T. Titus, editor of the S& Soddist, and the 
head of the Right wing was Dr. E. J. Brown, in later years Mayor 
I of Seattle on a fusion ticket. The struggle centered around the question of reformist petty-bourgeois domination of the Party, and against the suppression of rhe revolutionary elements and their pro- gram of struggle. The Left wing was supported m d y  by lumber 
I workers, city laborers and "5tump" farme-; whereas the Right wing drew its support chiefly from the petty businwen,  intellecntds, skilled workers and farmers. 
The Left wing had behind it a majority of the Party members, 
bur when the convention e m b l e d ,  the Right wing, which con- 
trolled the Party machinery, had managed to scare up a majoimity of 
the delegates. A split ensued and in consequence there were two 
&list Parties in the state. Whereupon, the opportunist-controlled I National Executive Commitrcs recognized the Right wing claim, 
excluding the Lefts, including myself, from tbe Party. 
This blow of the Right wing Saciak Party leadership was char- 
acteristic of their growing war against the revolutionary element in 
I the Party. Its consequence was, of course, seriously to injure the 
I Pattg. Hundreds of the best members, not only in Washington, but 
dso to a lesser extent in Oregon, Idaho, and Cdfornia, were driven 
out of the Party and never returned to it. Moa of h e m  (like my- 
self) joined the 1;W.W. and became Syndicah. The whole affair 
was a criminal waste of good proletarian fighters, the real builderg of 
the Party, by the reformist leadership. But this rupture was soon to 
be followed by another+lso forced by the opportunist Socialist 
Party plicies and leaders and far more disastrous to the Party- 
the big narional split of I9 12. 
In this period the working c h  was in a state of great foment 
The trade unions were growing rapidly and conducting many bit- 
terly-fought strikes. The I.W.W. was achieving a spewculr  ad- 
vance with the Lawrence textile strike and several other big struggles. 
T h e  Socialist Patty was growing rapidly and making fast headway 
in gaining Ieadership in the trade unions. It was & the time of 
the Roosewlt Bull Moose movement. All this militancy and struggle 
.of the toiling masses emphasized the futility of the reformist policies 
.of the Socialist Party leadership and stressed the need for a program 
of h struggle. But the opportunist leadership clung firmly to their 
reformist line. The struggle between the Right and Left wings of 
the Party quickly spread and sharpened. 
The Left wing, grown strong in this period of mass awakening, 
had built a national movement around the 2 m t w d m . d  Sociakt 
R&w, published by the Kerr Co., and the chief figures of which 
were Bill Haywood and Mary Marcy. This center circulated the 
works of Marx and Engels, routed revolutionary speakers, printed 
mvolutionary pamphlets and developed the Left wing theory and 
practice on current events. InevitabIy this Left center came into 
direct confiict with the National Ofice of the Socialist Parry, which 
systematically played down revoIutionary theory and agi;&n of 
every sort and poured out a flood of reformist propaganda,* In 
consequence a struggle for organizational control of the Party 
*me flock of %cialist Party Right wing intdectualr produced lotu of 
books and parnphleh but not one important Marxian work. The books of 
Myers, R w U  and Sinclair, dtbough f d  of valuable fsctud material, were 
but S& muckraking. Hillquit's booIra were only academic Marxism, and 
thost of Sirnous and Ontd w t c d  an opportunist conception of Amcriun 
history. Ghent and London, in their books, Bsnmolmt F&tisrse and Tka I m  
H d ,  produced notable w o h  but they a h  were saturated with oppommht 
cwtceptionh 
developed, and the wh& situation came to a dimax in the May, 
1912, Socialist Party convention. 
T h e  immediate program of the Lft wing in this crucial fight 
centered around three major issues: against the opportunist petty- 
bourgeois control of the Party; fox a plicy of militant industrial 
unionh; and against the parliamentary opportunism and vote- 
catching policies of the lcadership. The Left wing program at this 
I stage was stated in Haywood's and Bohn's pamphlet, Idu&1 
S ~ c i a h .  This program contained many characteristic semi-syndic& 
ist errors, such as underestimation of the role of the Patty and of 
B e  imporrance of p - h l  political &man&, illusim about dud 
industrial unionism, etc., but the essence of it was the traditional 
and comct aim of the Left wing to give the S O W  Party a policy 
of c h  struggle. 
The outcome of the convention was a major defeat for the 
Left wing, which was beaten on dl its Its questions. Firstly, it 
lost in the matter of diplacing the opportunist leadership, because 
during the preconvention elections so many petty-bourgeois elements 
gar thtmsclves elected as Llqatts that the convention was infested 
with and ~ o m ~ l c t e ~ ~  domhmd by all som of careerkt lawyers, 
journalist9, doctors, ctc. SecondIy, it Imt srlSo on the question of 
indusbiat unionism; for although the canventian trdorsed industrial 
uniohm in principle, it took no step to put it into effect through 
correcting the opportunist practices of the Party leaders in the A. F. 
of L. and by liquidating the dual unionimn of the Left wing. 
But the Left wing sufltred its Ccisive defeat on the g e n e d  
question of parliamentary opportunism. The Left wing's essential 
I psition m against the Party's king merely a vote-catching body, 
and wanted it to become a revolutionary propaganda organi~tion 
md lead in developing broad mass strugglta, especially on the eco- 
nomic field. But the Right wing was skillful maugh to evade the 
main h e .  It shifted the attack away from its own political oppor- I tun* and narrowed the fight down to an mult upon ;be Left wing's advocacy of sslbotage. Sabotage at the timc was very popular in the French Syndicalist movement and it had been taken up by the LW.W. and the Left wing of the Socialist Party. It was the pooxest p ' b k  buc for the Left wing to defend and the C O ~ ~ c ~ l t i O t i  voted 190 to 91 a g a h  it, adopting the notorious Artide 11, Section 6, amendment to the Party constitution, which ran : c.l) 
"Any memkr of the PPny who oppom political adon or ad- 
vwatw crimr,  bata age or other mttbodn of violtact am o wtapm 
of the woikiag dm to aid in itn emancipation &dl bt t@hd 
fm membtrahip in the Party." 3 
Thc basic meaning of all this ran far beyond the suppression of 
thc advocacy of sabotage ; it meant that the Party leadership had re- 
jected the policy of class struggle and had turned still deeper into 
the reformism that was ldlling the Party. Its lawyer-doetor-preacher 
heads were detcrmtted to wipe out the revolutionary tendency in the 
Party and they foIIowed up this convention victory by having Hay- 
wood recalled by referendum from the National Executive Cound. 
Thus, Bill Haywood, the revohtionary fighter who was worth 
,; 
scvcrd carloads of the apporhinist intellectuals who were running 
and ruining the Socialist Patty, was not deemed worthy of sitting 
upon the Party's executive, The elimination of Haywood was r 
Iogical climax to the leademhip's long and fatal war against the Left 
wing and its program of d m  struggle, the war that brought about 
the historic Mure of the Socialist Party. 
The outcome of the 1912 convention was a real disaster to the 
Wist Party, one from which it never fully recovered; The deadly 
grip of the petty-bourgeois leadership was strengthened and their 
opportmist policies more deeply intrenched. A sort of dent split 
developed, thousands of the best proletarian members, Haywood 
mong them, quitting the Party in disgust, never to return ; many of 
them going to Syndicalism and the I.W.W. Thus the Party was 
drained of its best blood, and the loss of all these workers and basic 
Party builders soon showed itself in a real &dine of the organiaa- 
tion. The Party dropped in membership from 1 18,045 in 1 9 12 (the 
highest point it ever reached in all its history) to 79,3 74 in 1915. I& 
national elcthn vote fell from 897,011 in 1912 to 585,113 in 
1916. And, of decisive impomnce, hs previous rapid advance in the 
trade unions was stopped and the Socialist Party lost ia opportunity 
to win the leadership of the  A. F. of L. Refomfrm9m had dealt a 
mortal blow to the Socialist Party. 
The 19 12 split, howevtr, could not be the dtcisivt fight between 
the reformist and revolutionary forces in the Socialist Party. The 
Sewnd International, which was not yet discredited by its betrayal in 
the World War and in the accompanying revoIutionary struggles, mil 
had great prestige as the revolutionary organization of the working 
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I &IS, the Party of Marx and Engels. Hence its b - o p p o r t u n l  
American section a h  remined the power to attract r e v a l u t i o ~  
' 
workerr. Moreover, the Sorialist Party Left wing, still saturated with 
se&n and Syndicalt tendencies, was as yet insuffificientlg developed 
ideologically to build a separate revolutionary party. So, with the 
great vitality and persistence which bespeaks rhe correctness of its 
revolutionary line, the Left wing, recovering from the dksmous 
1912 defeat, began once more to build the Socialist Party and to 
orgsnize its forces and program wirhm it. But the opportunism of 
the Socialist Party leadership was soon m cause r compkte break 
between the reformGt Right and the rewlutiamry Left and to call 
I into being the Communist Party. 
The 19 19 split in the American Socialist Party uras p r t  of the 
world-wide break between the reformist and r t v 0 1 1 1 ~  elemenra 
in the Second International, the split that gave birth to the Com- 
munist International. It was the inevitable culmination of the grow- 
iug antagonkm for years past between the revolutionists and the 
opportunists in the world Socialist movement. It was directly caused 
by the Second Internationat's support of the World War, by h 
mtagonim to the Russizlll rtvolutimJ and by its betrayal of the 
rtvolutiomty sbuggIes of the workers in Germany, Hungary and 
other European countries at the close of Ehc war. 
These great world events, of coursc, had profound repercwions 
in the American S o & k  Party. They brought to the breaking point 
the longdeveloping tension between the Right and Lcf t wings of 
the P a q  and made it irnpi'ble for the mutualIy anhgonistic re- 
formist and revolutionary clcmenrs to live within the one political 
organization. 
In the viral qutstion of the war, as we have seen, the Left wing 
of the American Socialist Party had energeticdl y oppased the whole 
war-timc course of the Second International, condemned the action 
of its @s which supported the war, and strongly resisted Ameri- 
ca's entry into and prmcution of the war. But the Right wing 
leaders of the Party, under cover of radical phrases, cornpromised 
with the war situation in a typical reformist manner. This brought 
to an acute stage the struggle between the two p u p s .  
The controvetsy within the Party over the Russian revoIution 
dtlso added fuel to the spreading conflagration. The rapidly growing 
Left wing heartily supported the revolution and accepted its great 
revolutionary lessons, indudimg the fundamenbt principles laid down 
by Lenin. But the Right wing hated the Russian revolution as 'the 
very victory symbol of the rtvolutionary spirit which they had fought 
against for so many years in the American Socialist Party. They 
rejected Lenin's teachings and placed the works af this greatest 
revolutionist since Mam upon the banned books Sit, where they still 
remain wtiI day. All of which deeply embittered the Left wing. 
T h e  growing struggle between the Right and LEft wings of the 
Party was further spread al?d intensified by Social-Democracy's 
betrayal of the German revolution at  the end of the war through 
the liquidation of the Soviets set up by the workers, soldiers 
and &Ion. This treacherous action, which saved capitalism through- 
out central Europe and to which the present-day Hitler can trace 
his power, met with the approval of the American Right wing and 
the bitter h d t y  of the Left. 
Thus, in this series of great even& the Socialist Party, iu the 
United States as well as abroad, was hopelessly split ideologically 
by the reactionary course of its opportunist leaders. The long years 
of struggle within the American Socialist Party, as in other eoun- 
mk, had come to a dimax. The two wings of the Party were at 
open war with each other. It was the parting d the ways between 
the two conflicting tendencies within the Party; between the policies 
of class struggle and c h  colhboration; between the revolutionists 
who were determined to overthrow capitalism and the opportunists 
who wanted to reform it, 
Inevitably the deep ideologica1 split al~a took on organizational 
form. And logically it was the Right wing, in line with its long 11 
struggle to kill the revolutionary tendency, that took the actual 
initiative in splitting the Party. Briefly, the break developed thus: 4 
The rewolutionists, led by C. E. Ruthenberg and organized first in 
the Socidist Propaganda League ((Boston, 19 15) and later in the 
Left wing of the Socialist Party (New York, June, 19191, had 
the support of the majority of the Party membership and in 191 9 
they elected 12 out of 15 members of the Nationd Executive Com- 
mittee of the Socialist Party. But the Right wing, which controUed 
the Party apparatus, repudiated this election and, in order to dom- 
hate the approaching Emergency Conwntion, suspended several 
language federations and the whole Michigan State Party organiza- 
tion (much as the A. F. of L. Executive Councl lately ousted 
the C.I.O.). At the convention itself in Chicago, August 30, 1919, 
the Rights, with the help of the police, expeUed all known Left wing 
delegates. 
The split was thus completed. At last the Right wing had sue 
ceeded in im historic aim of getting rid of the rtvof~~tionsry dement 
from the SociaIiit Party. But h e  ruinous consequences to the Socialist 
Party of this criminal expulsion of the Party's best forces, its very 
life blood, were not long in showing thtmselverr. The 1919 split 
turned out to be even more dimstrous to the S o d a b  Party h n  that 
of 1912. Within a year the P W s  membenhip dropped from 104,- 
822 to 26,766* and by I927 it had fallen to but 7,425. The in- 
fluence of the Party in the trade unions declined swiftly, and its vote 
in the Presidential elections of 1928 (262,805) was hardy marc 
than 25 per cent of its vote in 1920. Socidist representation in state 
and local legislative bodies fell to but a smd fraction of its f m r  
strength, The Party went generally into decay, and its once extensive 
prnrs was almost wiped out. Its opportunist leaders, with tht Lcft 
wing no longer on hand to remain them, completely abandoned dl 
fight against the A. F. of L. reactionaries and joined with them in 
their whole program of B. & 0. plan speed-up, labor banking, ex- 
pulsion of Communists, anti-Soviet dander, etc. Thus, reduced 
almost to zero in numbcrs, Muence and revolutionary principle, the 
bankrupt Sociiist Party h k  to the dregs the bitter cup of its 
opportunist petty-bourgeois leadership, with their fatal reformist 
p1icies and retntless war against the Left wing. 
In conistquence of the 1919 split the flag of sochIism passed 
from the hands of the Socialist Party. By twenty yern of oppr- 
tunism and fdure the Socialist Party petty-bourgeois leaders had 
shown that they would make no fight for revo1utianary ~ l c d k m .  
A new Socialist standard bearer, a revolutionary party, was n e e  
sary and it was formed, the Communist Party. 
In the summer o f  1921, the last detachment of the Left wing, the 
Workem Council group (Engdah& TrPcbtenberg, F i h  Fedemtiom, m) 
dm quit the Sacidist Party. 
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In previous spliw-1909, 1912--the exp~Ued Left wing be- 
came of its ideological undevelopment had either liquidated itsclf 
into I.W.W. Syndicalism or dribbled back individually to the So- 
d i s t  Party. But not so in 1919. T h e  revolutionaries, acquainted 
now with the principles of Leninism and educated by the great evens 
of the war and the post-war revolutions, had matured* theoretically. 
By 19 19 th Left wing had deared up, or was rapidly doing so, its 
traditional semi-syndicalist errors on such questions as the role of 
the state, the question o f  the dictatorship of the proletariat, the seizure 
of power, the role of the Party and the trade unions, ttc. fn short, 
as Alex Bittelman says, it had advanced "from vague Left Socialism 
and general proletarian militancy to the definite and d i d  founda- 
tians of Leninism".* Hence, on A u p t  3 1 and September 1, 29 19, 
in Chicago, the split-off Ltft wing of the Socialist Party organized 
itself into two Communk Parties. Between thm, howcver, the= 
was little difference in principle; m, finally, two years later, cbty 
fused into one united Communist Party. 
Here is not the place for a history of the Communist Party. 
The student can find this in BitteIman's Piftsm Y e m  of the Corn- 
m&t P q ,  Browder's Comm&m in & U&d SWS and W b  
Is C o d m ? ,  Bhba's Hitorg of t h  A e m  Wm&g C h s  
and my forthcoming book From Bym iu St&. In this study of the 
Socialist Party I cannot give even an outline of the Communist ' 
Party's development and policy. 
Suffice it to sag that the Communist Party has based itself firmly 
upon the dasffi struggle palicy which the Socialist Party throughout 
its h h r y  rejected. It has come forward energetically in the measure 
of its strength the leader of the masses in their daily fights against 
tht capitalist exploiters, and it has systematidly cultivated revolu- 
tionary Mab-Leninism among its own membership and mass 
foUowing. And the general result of this correct policy of chs strug- 
gle is the  present unity, growth and expanding influence of the 
Communist Party. 
As was to be expected, the development of the  rehlutionary 
P q  in the great- stronghold of  capitalism was no bed of roses. 
On the one hand, there had to be overcome, with the help of the 
Communist International, the harmful scmi-Syndicalist sectarian 
I conceptions inherited by the Left wing from the past, and this was 
not accomplished and a revolutionary program developed without 
sharp internal struggles and many serious error8 in j e  practid 
work of the Party. And, m the other hand, there had to be with- 
s t a d  the fierce attach of the capitalists and their agents, including 
styere governmental persecution, widespread expulsion from the 
trade unions and industry by reactionary union o f f i d  working 
with the boeises, ctc. 
But the Communist P a q  has prapered in spite of all thex 
difficulties. It is now unified and healtby, and its membetship and 
einflucnce arc constantly increasing. The P q ' s  recent membership 
@figures show: 1930--7,500; 1931-9,000; 1932-14,000; 1933 
+18,000; 1934--26,000; 1935-30,000; 1936--41,000, plus 
21 1,000 members in the Young Communist League or 52,000 in d. 
I; Wherever the fight is hottest there tbt Communist Party is to 
$c found organizing the toiiers'for a united front s m d  against the 
xploitexs, Not to mcnrion its mimy big struggles of past years, in- 
Puding the long fight for amalgamation and the Labor Party; the 
&ght against tbc B, & 0. pLn; the long struggle against corruption 
and gangsrerim in the unions; the big 1930-33 fights of the unem- 1 ployed; the many strike struggles of 1933-35, notably the San Fran- 
c k o  strike, etc. The Communist Party, with its broad united front 
policy, is phying rn active role on every front in the das auuggk. 
Here I can mention only a few of the Communist Party's chief 
current activities: At the present time it has mobilized the support 
f at least S,000;000 workers and others in support of the Workers 
ent Imrance Bill (HA. 2827). It is playing an impor- 
the American Youth Congress, which at its convention 
, July 3, 1936, had 1,400 dehgates representing a 
0,000. The Communist Party is likewisc a vid 
n League Against War and Fascism, a move- 
d Congress in Cleveland in Janua y, 1936, 
070 delegates from 1,840 organizations of 
Party's role was also one of significant 
zation of the great united front National 
-0, February, 1935, of 1,817 &legates 
0,000 members organized in trade unions, churches, 
In all these united front movements the Commu- 
c i a  M i p n t .  It is also taking an active pan in 
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che prmnt big drive of the C.I.O. to organize the steeI, auto, rub- 
ber, and other mass production industries. In addition, the Party is 
active in dewloping the Farmer-Labor Party movement. This was 
acknowledged when, at the May 330, 1936, Farmer-Labor mnfcr- 
ence in Chicago, attended by prominent leaders of the Minnesota 
Farmer-Labor Party, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, many 
local h h r  parties, etc., the Communist Par9 delegates were offi- 
cially mated. 
A most important present activity of the Communist Party and 
an evidence of its growing mass influence i its militant fight against 
the suspension of the C.I.O. unions by the A. F. of L. Executive 
Council. Up to the present writing 20 mate federations, 70 central 
bodies, several international unions and hundreds of I d s  have 
protested the suspsbn.  The rn- of trade unionists are enraged 
at the attempt of Green, Hutcheson .and Co. to split the labor move- 
ment, and the Communist Party has been very active in crystallizing 
this mas  resentment into concrete action. The C.I.0, to date bas 
bestirred itself very little in organizing this protest, and as for the 
S a d k  Parry, p'astratcd by its hesitant attitude and internal cham, 
it has made virtually no dght whasaever to preserve the uniy of the 
made union movement. 
The growth and accomplishments of the Communist Party arc, 
of course, very modest in -parkon with the grtrt revolutionary . 
fggltg ahead. The P a y  also still bas numy weaIcntsses and insuffi- 
ciencies thrr haw to he corrected. But the important thing is that the 
Party is on the right track, its fundamend program of class strug- 
gle is correct, its policies of the broad united front a n  sucwssf ul, and 
it is learning to appIy them effectively. This i amply proven by the 
revalutionary Communist Party's record of growth and progress, in 
compsrrison with the historical failure of tbt reformist Socialist Party. 
The Communist Pnrty is becoming a major politid factor in the 
Y 
country, while the Sodollist Party flounders along in crisis and de- 
cline. All of which goes to show that in the many long years' fight 
between Rights and Lefts in the American revolutionary movement, 
the Lefts were profoundly correct. Not dong the road of refarmism, 
3 
but of class struggle is the way the workers have to go to achieve 
socialism. 
The Present Situation in the Socialist Party 
The T H ~  to thb Left 
S WE have seen, the present crisis in the Sm'dist Party is not a A matter of recent development. It is the piled-up result of long 
years of wrong policy, of Right opporn~nism, of flagrant viahtion 
of the Marxian class struggle policy which was fundamentally neces- 
sary to build the Socialist Party. But in the last three years there 
has bcen something of a change in the Sociarkt Party's traditional 
trend, That Party has shown fresh Left tendencies, and with them 
some signs of renewed growth and activity. 
Among the more marked of,these tendencies were an overhauling 
of the Socialist Party's theoretical line, which resulted in the adop- 
tion of a more Left statement of principles at the Detroit, 1934, 
convention; greater mass activity in the daily dass struggle, espe- 
ciaUy among the unemployed; a growing tendency towards united 
front movements with the Communist Party; a growth of the 
Party's membership from 10,389 in 1931 to 19,121 in 1935 ; an 
increase in the nationaI election vote to 883,341 in 1932, as against 
262,805 in 1928; the defeat of the "OId Guard" as the Party 
leadership, and the split with these clements at the Cleveland 1936 
national Party convention. 
A number of forces combined to bring about the new Left ten- 
dencies in the Socialist Party. The most decisive of these was the 
great radicalization of the proletariat during the past few yea* 
marked hy the many big struggles of the unemplgred, the huge 
- strike wave, the expansion of the unions, the growth of Labor 
Party sentiment, the formation of the C.I.O., the widely spreading 
I 
mass discontent with capitalism as a system, etc. This basic mltss 
radicalization movement naturally' had its effect upan the Socialst 
Party by forcing it, especially from the  pressure of its new proleta- 
rim members, into activity and into a more Left position. Another 
very important factor in the Socialist Party's reawakening was the 
shameful surrender of German Social-Democracy in face of the rise 
of Hitler. This development, followed soon afterward hy the vic- 
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tory of in Austria, exped  the utter bankruptcy of 
reformism and stimulated the Left tendency, not only in the Amcri- 
cm SociaIist Party but a h  in many other parties of the Second 
International. Another basic factor g r d y  encouraging Left dcvel- 
opmena in the Socialist Party was the continued success of the 
Sovitt Union. The victorious Soviet government, the fruit of Com- 
munist policy, stands out in glaring contrast with the great defeat 
of the whde line of the Socialist reformi= and consequently has 
a revoiutionizing e&ct upon the proletarian members of the Socisll- 
ist Party. The growth of the popular front movement in Spain and 
France in the past two yearn had a s i m k  result. And, finally, rhe 
growth of the American Communist Party, in contrast with the 
crippled Socialist Party, ha. a big influence in developing Left senti- 
ment among the Sodalist Party working class memben. 
The Communist Party welcomes the new Left tendencies in the 
Socialist Party for the good and obvious reason that every increase in 
rtvdutionar y stndment and organiation is f undamenbIly advan- 
tageous to the  working &a and henee also to the Communist Party. 
And in supporting the new Left wends in the Socialist Party a 
central task is to analyze and evaluate them. The question before us 
here is to learn whether in b new orientation the Socialist Party has 
succeeded in overcoming the ruinous reformist policies which it pur- 
sued for a full generation and which have reduced it to its present 
critid pition. 
First let us consider the question of leadership. In previous pges 
f have minted out what a disaster it waa for the Socialist Partv to 
haw hkn dominated from t h ~  outset $ a pettg-bourgeois leaher- 
ship of lawyers, preachers, doctors, etc. They were the chief source 
of the opprtunkm that hamstrung the Party throughout the years. 
What has happened to the Socialist Party then in this respect in its 
new Left turn? 
Here we get an unfavorable answer. The situation remains sub- 
stantially as before. True, a raft of these petty-bourgeois reformists 
quit the  Party in the 1936 Right wing split, formed the People's 
Party and are now waging war against the Socklist Party. There 
are new, young leaders developing in the Socialist Parry, but still  the 
Party is heavily dominated by non-proletarian elements. This was 
r manifested at the CIeveland convention, with its many preachers, 
lawyers, etc., and it is also expressed by the petty-bourgeois make-up 
of the Socialist Party National Executive Committee. Of the eleven 
members in this committee four are lawyen, four are preachers and 
two professors; only one is proletarian,. and he is a trade union offi- 
, cial. Compare this S d i s t  Party aon-working & leadership with 
the Political Committee of the Camrnuaist Party which is composed 
of I 1  members, dl proletarians.* 
The Communist Party is not in principle against the memhrship 
of middle class intellectuals, Such irrtellectds, when they art revo- 
lutionmy, have a great contribution to make ta the working dais 
movement. Thig was brilltntly demonstrated by the life work of 
Marx, Engels, Lenin and many others. But not by the type of oppor- 
tunist intellectuals that have always shaped the policies of the Ameri- 
can Socialist Party. Throughout iti, entire history t h e  petty-bour- 
geois reformists have been a barrier in the way of the Socialist Party's 
develuping a hedthp dass struggle policy and, despite the new Left 
trends, that barrier still exists. The proletarhidon of the leader- 
ship of the Sodalist Party is a fundamend necessity in order for that 
organization to develop towards a strong and revolutionary paw. 
Next we turn to the question of plicy. I shall state the question 
concretely: In previous chapters I have pointed out in considerable 
detail, how the inability of the Socialist Party to huiId itself into n 
strong revolutionary party during irs long history must be ascrlhd 
to its failure to carry out a M-an class struggle policy, that is, (a) 
h failure to come forward aggrm'vely as the mas leader of the 
working clw in its struggles for everyday cconomic and political 
demands; (b) its failure to educate and develop a d i d  body of 
traitted Marxian revalutionaries as the  backbone of the Party. Now 
let us see whether or not the Socialist Party, with its recent Left turn, 
has liquidated these two fatal reformist wealme- or sham indica- 
tions o f  doing so. 
1. THE QUEST LO^ OF THE DAILY MASS ~ U G G L E ~  
The answer to this question must be negative. The Socialist 
Party's new line, especially in its Iatest developments, docs not make 
-
*The W i t  Party National Exccutivc Committee is still mom ua- 
rep-tative in thot it conhim no Negro, womw w youth membersi w h e m  
in tbe Cammunisi Party top committee6 hcsc hmenta are f d y  rep-tad. 
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for increasing its leaderrhip of the masses in their daily economic and 
political struggles. Throughout the history of the Socialin Party prior 
to 1934, as we have seen, the  openly Right wing reformist policy of 
the Party, the tendency for the opportunist petty-bourgeois leaders 
to soft-pedal and cclrnpromise aU struggles of the workers, was the 
obstacle that prevented the Socialist Party from becoming the daily 
mass leader of the proletariat. The Party has not, despite its new 
turn, been able to free itself of this traditional reformism. It has 
only sua:eded in adding new forms to its reiormist line, 
The* new forms of reformism consist of a tendency towards 
sectarianism. The sectarian tendency dresses itself up with many 
revolutionary phrases, but it is opportunistic just the same. And it is 
no less fatal to effective m a s  work than open Right opportunism. It 
has ken  especially manifest in the past year and has already done the 
Sorhlist Party much harm. Unlw it k speedily corrected it will have 
deadly effects upon the Sacialist Party by still further isolating it 
from the life and struggles of the masses. 
A .  The Nekv Socialist P M I ~  Sect& Reformism 
There is at present great theoretical confusion in the Socialist 
Party, what with groups of ('Old Guard" reformists, Thornadtes, 
Hoanites, "milhnts", Trotskyites, Lovestoncites, and a minority of 
developing Leninists all advocating their respective flicies and 
struggling for control of the Party, whik the split-off "Old Guard" 
makes war from the ourside. The  dominant voice in the inncr- 
parry cham is that of Norman Thomas. He ia the outstanding theo- 
retical leader of the Party and bc is especially active in injecting the . 
new elements of sectarianism into the general reformist line of tht 
Party, His program boils down to a curious combination of Right 
and "Left" sectarianism superimposed upon a basic structure of the 
old discredited class collaboration of the Second International. 
It is not surprising that there should develop sectarian tendencies 
of revolutionary phrasemongering among the Socialist Party mem- 
bership. Unquestionably, the proletarian members of the Socialist 
party-in the& new  eft mood'want to make a revolutionary organ- 
ization of their Partv. but with no solid M-an training as a 
, - " 
background, they drift off into mere revolutionary phnse-making 
instead of making a sound revolutionary policy. It is what knin  
a called the infantile slckness of "LzFtism". This tendency is worsened 
apportunlst leadership of the Party which 
workers' revolutionary m d s  into mere 
radical phr&-making and thus avoids real mass struggle. They con- 
tinue their opportunist line in a different form. 
At first glance it may seem astonishing tbat a pronounced advo- 
ate of the new sectarian tendency should be Norman Thomas, 
who hitherto has always been an open Right opportunist. But such 
16 Left" vagaries are not uncommon on the part of Sorialist middle- 
class intellectuals all over the world. I need only refer to the case 
of the ultra-opportunist C.  E. R u s d  joining with Debs ia warning 
againse opportunism m the Sodis t  Party in their pamphlet Dmgw 
A h d ,  or the c w  of the reformist Prank Bohn lining up with Bill 
bywood in the 19 12 inner-party fight, or the recent instance of 
A. J. Muste, who in a few years completed the cpde of pachef- -  
progressive trade unionist-Left Sodah+Tmt&yite and then baa 
to preacher a g n .  Right apportunists can easily fly over to "Lefts' 
sectarian pitions. 
The sectarian danger in she Socialist Party was greatly increased 
by that Parry's recent absorption of the T r o w  group, Just at 
the time when these counter-revolutimarv elements were being 
proved to be terrorkts and &s the S&st Party saw fit 
titkc them to its W. But it will inevitably pay dearly for this 
m w e  in l a  of s t r e n d  and influence. The Tro*tes, who are 
finding easy pickings i;! the confused, chaotic &idkt Party, are 
tending greatly to turn that organization into an anti-Communist, 
r anti-Soviet sect. This will drive the best worker elements out of the Socialist Party and will furtber weaken its contare with the masses. Not long since the French Socialist Party also made the mistake 
, of swallowing the noisome Trotsky group, but it soon bad to relieve 
iwIf of the poisonous, indigestible mw, and the American Suciah / Party will have to do the -c if it is to develop into a healthy prty. 
B. Utocler~stimdiw of I-diade D n d s  r Now let us look at the practical app11catian of the Socialist Party's new mixture of sectarianism and Right reformism, of which Thomas is the great champion. The h e m  of Thomad theorizing is to the effect chat inasmuch as capitalism is now breaking down the fight for parrial economic and political demands is rehtively unimportant and that the immediate iswe upon which dl attention shauld be con- 
centrated is the basic revolutionary question of socialkn versus caw 
talism. His pition, in subwance, is &at the worken cannot ~gtkfy 
their most immediate needs or wct their mosr eIementllry rights 
short of establishing a socialist society. Thomas says, "The immediate 
demand of the SacSists is socialism."* 
Now d this sounds yery revolutions y, especially coming from 
N o r m  Thornas who only three years ago was enthused over the 
''steps toward socialism" of Roosewlt. But actually it is only radical 
phrascmongering. Its general effect is to weaken the struggle of the 
workers and to pIay into the hands of the bosses. Its continuance 
will make havoc with what membership and standing the Socialist 
Parry still has left. 
i 'h~mab'  playing down of immediate partial demands gae~ 
counter to the whole need and trend of the revolutionary movement 
His line is one. of mere agitation, not struggle. The fight for 
demands is the starting point for all revolutionary struggle. And 
never did rhey play such a &a1 role as they da now, with the workers' 
civic, working, and living standards being so viciously attacked by 
the growing fascist reaction. As thc Communist Party carrectly 
a militant defense of the workers' immediate interem is the 
firse condition fbr the &olelopent of the struggle against capitalism 
as a system. It is only in such fights thar the workers can develop 
the necessary undezstanding, confidence and organization. When 
Thomas puts out his slogan, "If reform is the way out, hetter bck 
with the Raosevelt administration", and then backs this up by soft- 
pedaling the fight far the immediate issues confronting the toiIing 
masses and by c o n c e n ~ t h g  upon mere agitation for the establish- 
ment of smialism, he ahdons the prcsentday fighting field of the 
revolutionary movement and reducm the whole struggle for socialism 
to an empty abstraction. He not only undermines the presentday 
fight of the workers but the ultimate aims of rht working class as 
well. In the name of sociaIism he hamstrings the fight for socialism. 
And the effect of it all upon the Sotialist Party is still further to 
isolate it f ram the life and struggles of the masses and thus to push 
it along the fatal road of sectarianism. It is d$o water on the mill 
of the counter-revolutionarp Trowites who are stmgg1hg ta con- 
trol the Sociakt Party, 
I C. The Retreat Befwe Fascism 
Consequent upon his failure to ptrceive the fundamental impor- 
tance of the fight for immediate demands in the development of the 
revolutionary struggle in general, Tbomas abandons the field in the 
face of advancing fasci i .  With his consmnt h q h g  upon the one 
string of "socialism versus capitalism" he quits the red revolutio~~ary 
battle which, in its p m t  preliminary stages, is now being waged 
around the central question of " d e m w a ~  Venus fascism". Is this 
not srs clear as day in France and Spain? There the workers and their 
allies, who in their overwhelming mas  would remain unresponsive 
to sterile and academic talk such as Thomas' about estabhhing 
mialism forthwith, are nevertheless drawn into rtvolutionsry ac- 
tivity bp their fight against the attacks of the fkists  upon their 
present divic, working, and living standards. Their movement begins 
as a defensive fight for the most elementary immediate needs, thtir 
wages, their right to organize, the national independence of their 
countries, etc., but it soon passes over to a muntcr-o&mke struggle 
for major objecti~es making definitely towards a revolutionary clash 
with capitalism. 
Thus in F m c e  tbe workers and their d i e s  were not content 
simply with setting up the Blum government as a defense against 
f&sm but carried their counter-off-ve much further, adding 
3,000,000 new members to the trade unbns, securing wage incfesses, 
shorter hours, vacations with pay, etc., ac. And in S+ this whole 
revolutionary trend iR even more marked. Who can doubt but that 
the masses in these countries, s t h g  from th& defense of their 
democratic rights and developing their counter-offensive, have made 
huge strides in the direction of the find struggle for s o d k u ?  
And the same general rule applies to the United States. When 
Thomas does not see the question of progress versus reaction, of 
democracy v e m  faxism, as the h u e  of immeditc struggle, he 
faits to see the present-day revdutionary struggle in general and 
he lives in a realm of reformist sectarian abstractions. 
Where Thomas' blindness on the issue of democracy versus 
fascism leads to in actual practice is shown by the tragically r i b -  
lous padtion of the Socialist Party in the 1936 Presidential election 
campaign, which is still going on as I write this. The situation is tbat 
the Liberty LPague and other great capitakt interests, which embody 
the rcal threat of f& and of which such figures as Cwghh, 
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Smith, Talmadge, etc., are satellites, are bitterly opposed to Roose- 
velt's concessions to the toiling masses, meager though they were, 
and they are almost solidly behind Landon. Roosevelt has served 
them welI. His proudest boast is that he saved the capitalist systtrn 
by the New Deal. But the big utploiters are determined to find an 
even more convenient instrument for putting across their ultra- 
reactionary program, a program which inevitably Ieads in the direction 
of faxism. 
It is clear that the Republican candidate Landon. with his false- 
face of liberalism and his ;utelage by the fascist ~ e a r k ,  is the spkes- 
man of the main fascist danger in this country. Although he 
himself is not definitely a fascist and while his victory would 
not result immediately the establishment of fascism, it would, 
nevertheless, undoubted1y stimulate en~rmously the employers' re- 
actionary offensive and greatly facilitate the growth of h i s t  ten- 
dencies. In line with the realities of the situation, therefore, the 
Communist Party has correctly singled out Landon as the chief 
expressian of the fascist menace and urges his defeat. But this 
by no means implies endwmcnt of Roostvelt. O n  the contrary, the 
Communist Party mints out that with his constant serviee to re- 
actionary finance- &tal Roosevclt is an ardent defender of capital- 
ism and is no barrier to £ a s k .  It advocates the formation of a 
united front anti-fascist Farmer-Labor Party and, in the absence 
of such a prty, in the present elections, it-calls upon the masses 
to vote far the Communist Party candidaes, Browder and Ford. 
But Thomas can see no fascist danger in Landon. Quite the 
reverse: he concentrates his main fire against Roosevelt and gives 
direct support to Hearst's mm, Landon. The fascist-like election 
srrategy of the Republican Party and its heavy financial backers is, 
through the candidacy of Landon, to put somethhg of a liberal . 
face upon their reactionary program and thus to delude the ceases. 
But Thomas, d e a d  of joining with the Communises, trade union- 
ists, liberals, etc,, in exposing this dangerous demagogic trick, pra- 
ceeds to give it practical support. 
'llamas aids the capitalist demagogy by absolving Land011 of any 
taint of fascism and accepting this pseudo-liberalism at its face value. 
He assails the Communists for ascribing a fascist tendency to Landon 
and he can we the trend towards fascism only in such figures as 
Coughlin, Smith, etc. Says Thomas, "The fascist demagogue will talk 
- I 
-. 
like Huey Long or maybe like LC&, bur not like Landon or 
hw".* This attitude constitutes direct aid to the fascist Hearst's 
candidate, as it tends ta disarm the masses and lure them into the 
. demagogic mp set for them by fascist-minded big capital.** But Thomas gws further than thi& He a h  undertakes to cleanse 
t Ladon's big financial supprtem themselves of any suspicion of 
, fh. Tbis he does with doubly fdacious argument, Firstly, he 
presents the deadly reformist illusion that fascism is a movement 
of the middle dm,*** instead of its being & d y  the movement 
of finance capital, with the mid& class serving as its -1; and 
: secondly, he makes the ridiculous assertion that the Republican Party, 
the party of monopoly capital, instead of tending on towards fw 
; c b  and further r n ~ n o ~ ~  h actually trying to turn back 
[ the wheels of time and return to the period of relatively free mm- ptitim, to the individ* capitalh of the nineteenth century. 
! He declares, KLandon, or the forces and inter&& behind him which 
are arongcr than Landon, arc in the strict sense of the word re- 
d o ~ .  They want to go baeg to 4m older capital&''.**** Thus, 
Thomas would have the workers believe that finance capid presents 
of fascism, but is actuallp a barrier against it. 
Consequent upon this absurd analgsis, Thoma arrives at the 
condusion that it makes no difference whether R m v e l t  or Landon 
is elected. But in reality the weight of his argument f avo= Landon, 
and gives him direct support. Indeed, Thomas finds a characteristic- 
dy ridiculous reason for the election of Landon when be says: "Con- 
ceivably a Ladon victory might put iron in labor's blood."**** 
When Hearst, to ekct Landon through a Red scare, lyingly alleged 
that the Communim were supporting Roasevelt, Thomas at ona 
rushed into print and seconded Hearst's charge. Small wonder then 
Quoted in D d y  W*, JoIp 13, f 936. 
** T&om& of bdon'a  demo& prttam of l h d i a u  wan 
evidenced by bin much publidzed letter to Landon &g bim to atate m m  
, @y hiq @tion towarch Iabor. For thin arvice to Landon, Tbomm t ~ l s  
h d y  p d  by Hcawt md the whole R q u b l i ~ ~ n  p m  and randy con- 
demned by many when of fit 
***UThe mtialthingahutfoocirmin Bumpa i that it bamiddlw 
claw movement, d h c d  n d y  os mneb agaht intornationd )mnkcn or 
fintocrab M again* organid w o r h n  d f ~  tk Nap DEa&wk#t p. I#+ 
*+- So*t Call, Sept. 12, 1936. 
***+* IbS .  
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that Hearst, the cbie f American fascist, should quote him approvingIy 
in hi3 great chain of papers. And it is significant that with the Re 
publicans in the election campaign fiercely denouncing not only 
Browder, but also such people as Frankfurter, Tugwell, Icke~, 
Wallace, Lewis, Hillman, Dubinsky, and even bosevelt him&, 
as dangerous Communists, they exempted Norman Thomas entirely 
from their attack. In Mineoh, New York, the Republican dv au- 
thorities refused a public building for a meeting of the American 
Labor Party (to which 450,000 New York trade unionists are 
n-ted) on the ground that it was Communistic, but they freely 
dlowed the use of the hall the following night to the Socialist Party, 
with Norman Thomas as speaker. 
T h e  1936 national elections constitut~ the sharpest dioisions 
in American history. On the one side, there is the greatest aggrega- 
tion of capital that has ever backed any American politid prty and, 
on the other, an unprecedented concentration of the toiling masses. 
Although the o p m g  dass line-up and program are as yet by no 
means complete and char-cut, this election fight amounts to the first 
red battle betwen the forces making for fascism and t h e  fighting 
against it. And in thiD important situation the Malist Party finds 
h l f  on the wrong side of the barricade. For this it is h a d y  pap- 
ing dearly in Iessened prestige and influence, and it is being e m d  
still further to the Trotskyrte poison within its t imes.  
The new trend in the Saeiallst Party has not given that Party 
a revolutionary peace policy. True, the Socialist Party makes a great 
show of r a d i b  in its attitude towards the war that now threatens 
to deluge the world anew with blood. But in reality its policy in this 
vital matter is only its traditional reformist line, with the new see- 
wian trimmings. Its wrong attitude stands in the way of the 
Socialist Party doing real anti-war service md of its developing 
m a s  leadership on this fundamental h e .  The mtmbefship of the 
Socialist Party are, of course, genuinely in favor of pace but their 
Party's program is not r true peace policy. And this wrong policy in 
the srruggle against war is made dl tbe worse by the grow'ng in- 
fluence of the Trotskyites in the Socialist Party. 
Briefly, the war situation is this: Fascist Germany, Japsn and 
Italy in an hiimperialist drive to acquire markets, natural resources 
- 
- .  
md colonies, and ta smother their own internal crisis, are developing 
a great bloc for a war ofiensive against various other countries as 
m i o n  dictates, among them the capitalist democracies of France, 
England, the United States, Spain, Czechoslovakia, etc., as well as 
against the Soviet Union. It k a basidly different wltuation from 
that prevailing on the eve of the 1914 World War. At that time 
two mutually warlike and aggresive groups of imperialist powers 
confronted each other; but now the capitalist democracies, colonies 
and sadist U.S.S.R., whicb all  want peace, are definitely on the 
defensive in the tace of the militant h i s t  o&nsive. 
Should the fascist a g g m r s  succtcd in their war plans of mas 
daughter and subjugation, it would be a crushing blow to liberty in 
every counny. Their murderous attack aims to extinguish all 
semblances of labor organization and civil rights in Europe and to. 
reduce h e  living standards of the toiling m e s  to c d i e  levels; 
it also menacw the @tical independence of many countries, and its. 
most central objective is to drown the Soviet governmtnt in the 
greatest bloodbath in hho  y. T h e  fascht offensive threatens the very 
existence of modern civilization and ie succcss would be a major 
h t e x  KO the human race. 
In the face of this ulm&gerous situation the Soviet Union 
leads the struggle for the maintenance of peace. It seeks to develop 
a combined defensive by the mialist and democratic forces of the 
world, on the basis of a program of d d v c  security, to stop tbe 
war which the fa&& arc preparing so delibermly. And more and 
more the world's labor movement and the democratic countries are 
rallying to this program. But this struggle has still greater impka- 
tiom than that of saving the world from a horrible slaughter. It 
dso dovetails with the fight of the revoludonary movement for 
wialism at the present h e .  Should the combined pace forces be 
able to prevent the war it means that the advance of sodim thereby 
will be greatly facilitated in every county; and if they have t* 
' defeat m i l i d y  the fax& in a war forced by the latter it will 
surely be a prelude to proharim revolutions in many countries. The 
struggle to prestrw democracy and to maintain peace is also, for the 
toiling maws, the fight fot sociaism. 
But the sa recently super-revolutionary Thomas will have none 
of this. He repudhs  all efforts to force the American government 
to take a stand with other democracies against rhe fascist aggr- 
and he like& rejects this policy far Europ~an nations, With a 
pseudo-radical gesture he sweep away th correct revolutionary 
strategy of the Communist International and thE Soviet Unian. 
Echoing the "Red imperialism'' &den of Gutsky and the l ie of 
Hider that the U.S.S.R. is the red  sour- of the war danger, 
Thomas denounces the  Communists and other advocates of collec- 
tive security agaiast the fascist b a r h  as "crusaders for a new 
holy war". He snecrs at the pace struggle led by the Soviet Unian 1 
to halt the war-making faxists as being rncreIy preparations for "a 1 
' g o d  war between capitalist nationssy.* Then he plumps for the 1 
American bourgeois imperiaIist policy of " n e e  and "isolation", 
the policy mask behind which American c a p h l h  hides its aggres- 
sive slims 
Thomas' policy of ''keeping out of it" is, in plain Englisb a , 
shameful surrender before the attack of Hirler, Mussolini & k. 
It is an abandonment of the embattled revolutinnary labor move- 
ment of Europe. Thomas' determination not to actively assist the 
workers of Europe in case of a fascist-made war he justifies by the 
following puerile argument: 
' I t  should be rtmemkrcd that there is DO particular virtue in 
helping an Tnnotent' nation [one of tho- attacked by thc farcisb- 
WZ.F.1 by enabling the du Pont family to d l  powder to them at 
a great praftt."+* 
The  readiness of Thomas to betray the Soviet Union in ease 
of war is clearly shown in the following disgraceful statement: 
"b not R u d a  today strong enough to take eaxc of h d f  with- 
out asking workem in other lmda in her behalf to accept the terror 
and futility of one more 'good' war?"*** 
The American imperialkt policy of "holation", which Thomas 
accepes with a ffauriah of much radical phraseology, cannot prevent 
war nor keep the United States out of war if and when it comes. 
"The way to keep America out of war is to keep war out of the 
world", correctly says the Communist Party. &d this can ody 
be done by an organized struggle for peace on the part of tbt anti- 
I war forces of the world against thc maddog fasdst war-makers. 
I The great p e n t  I& of the revolutionary movefnent is to mobilize 
the workers and their allies for this w g l e  against war, and it is 
1 a task tbat the Communist ~~ are everywhere loyally fualling. 
But the Socialist Party, wirh its "stag out of it" A m e k  capitalist 
I n e e  theories, has abdicated mass hadership in this struggle for 
pace and is objectively lending suppod to the fascist war-makers in 
Europ and this country. 
The matter of breaking the -6 away from the two capitalikt 
pdcs and building a great Fxrmer-Lhr Partp is a fuadamenta 
, necesdq to combat the advance of reaction and f h  in thim tom- 
try. And never was the sentiment so strong as now mong the 
workers for such a prty. But hesitan9 and delay in the matter are 
highly dangerous. Because the A. F. of L. trade union bodies, upon 
whom the principal responglBil3y f a  for launching such a party, 
have failed to act we see huge masses of discoutenttd workers, small 
farmers, erc., f a n g  undet the control of the Coughlins, Lemkes, 
Townsends, etc., in their incipient faxkt third party which is o p d y  
ding Landon reactha& in the election campaign. It is the gretrt 
task of the Farmer-Labor Party, the A m h  form of the People's 
Front, to prevent the huge toiling m- who arc seething with dis- 
content from being trapped by reacrionary and f& demagopm 
sad to give the masses a powerfill anti-fascist politid weapon. It is 
because of t b e e  vital comiderations that the Communist Party is a 
constant and militant fighter for the establhhent of the Farmrr- 
Labor Party. 
But here again on this basic issue the S o d i s  P a r q  still fdows o 
reformist policy highly detrimental to its dovelnpment of mass leader- 
ship and effective struggle. In previous pages f have pointed out that 
the Soc;alist Party with its preacherdoctor-hwyer leadership fol- 
lowed for many years a sect& anti-hbor policy that w a  
~ t r o u s  to the Sod& Party's development as a mass proletarian 
m. For a few years there was a tendency t4 correct tbis dkstrow 
policy, but now the kcidkt Party, with its outbreak of seiecEaiian 
phrasemaking, is falling again into the b i s t o h l  m h k c  of an 
anti-labor party pol*. 
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It is true that the Socialist Party does lip service to the question 
of the Farmer-Labor Party, but that is about as far as it goes. In 
practice the Socialist Party folIows a h e  inimical to the Farmer- 
Labor Party. This manifests itself by the S o d k t  Party's systematic 
opposition to a11 steps leading towards the actual formation of the 
Farmer-Labor Party. It hinders the Farmer-Labor Party by insisting 
upon an unduly radical program for it and by putting forth pi- 
rn*c argumenB that there is as yet no mass basis for such a party. 
Besides, the Sociaiist Party takes little or no active part in the now 
necew ry preliminary agitation and organization s t e p t h e  buiIding 
of Iocal and state parties, Farmer-Labor Party conferences, etc.- 
and often actualy reresists thee movements. Thus the Socialist Party 
declined even to attend the important Chicago, May 30, conference 
called by the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party and it assumed an atti- 
tude of sharpest hostility towards the Ameriw Labor Party of New 
York, which is an important indication of the trend of the Com- 
mittee for Industrial Organization towards a national Labor Party. 
And highly significant of its sectarian attitude, the Socialist Party in 
its most important 1936 election campaign document, the Party fit- 
form, does not even r i s e  the question of the Farmer-Labr Party, 
an omission which puts forward the emaciated and half-lifeless 
Socialist Party, as the only political prspective, organizationaIly 
speaking, for the American working c h  and its allies, 
T h e  Socialist Party never, at  any time, fuIIy freed itself from 
the harmfuI illusion which it held for many years that the Labor 
Party was a. rival prty, a cornperitor to the Socialist Party. And 
now, with the new wave of sectarianism in the Socialist Party, 
this long-imbedded wrong conception gains fresh ground. This is 
clearly shown by the platform omission of the question of the 
Farmer-Labor Rrty. It is aleo evidenced by the fact that at the 1936 
convention of the Socialist Party 64 delegates (against 119) voted 
opposition in principle to the Labor Party. The baneful and growing 
influence of the Trotskyites in the Socialist Party greatly increases 
this anti-Farmer-Labar Party trend. Thus the Socialist Party raises 
a high barrier of sectarianism thar blocks its way to mass influence 
and leadership on the fundarncntzllly important issue of the Farmer- 
Labor Party. 
T o  the foregoing instances of sectarian trends and openly oppdf- 
tunist hang-over policies from the past that still remain in the mass 
work of -the Socialist Party many others of similar character could 
be added. The same narrow line is to be observed increasingly in the 
Socialkt Party's work in the trade unions, among the unemployed, 
in the youth activitk, among the sbarecropptis, etc. And the general 
eEect of it all is, during the past year or so since the sectarian trends 
have become more pronounced, to cut away the Socialist Party's 
already greatly weakened mass influence and to reduce still further k 
badly shattered membership. 
It is characteristic of Norman Thomas' rok in the Socialist Party r 
that, with his great show of radical phrssernoagef hg, he should find 
the way to distort inta a sterile sectarianism the Socialist Party prole- ,, 
tarian membership's desire to make their Party truly revolutionary, 
In every imporcant situation Thomas seems to have the unhappy 
faculty of finding the way to inaction llnd surrender. He is a> . 
confirmed prophet oS pessimism and defeatism. But fortunately his 
non-fight way is not the way of tbe masses. For them the class 
struggle is not merely a matter of philosophical speculation; their 
very lives and 11h&s are at stake, and they will fight norwithstanding 
the surrender advice of Thomas. I 
Many examples might be cited of Thomas' non-struggle policies, 
Thus, for instance, when Roosevelt promulgated hi N.R.A. Thomas 
promptly called upon the workers not to strike. Happily, however, 
they disregarded his counsel of e v e  reliance upon Roosevelt and 
carried through successfuIly one of 4 e  greatest strike waves in 
American history. Again, in his book, As I SGG It, Thornas was at 
great pains to show, in his defense of purely parliamentary tactics, 
that armed action by the workers has been rendered obsolete and 
-, 
imp0ssliIe by the development of the airplane and other modern 
military weapons. But the workers of Spain, against whom the great- 
butk of the trained army revolted, are now giving a glorious negative 
- 
to Thomas' surrender propaganda. Thorns' abandonment of thy, 
. 
European workers' fight for peace is aka rr non-struggh policy that 
the masses will reject, And now in his new book, After the Mew 
Deal-Whrort Norman Thomas not only sees fascism as inevitable 
in the United States following the  next serious ecofiomic crisis,* bu& 
- _ I .  
* ~ t  sip, =The only hope of burgpais dm-cb to -pe f m c h  iD . 
tn escape tbis whirn dfiw trk NOM D s a k W k ?  p. 154. 
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more or less universal after the world war that is now brewing. 
But again the workers will disappoint this monumental pessimism 
of Thomas. They will never accept his inevitability-of-fascism 
theories. They will h v e  a big word to s y  before f e r n  can possibly 
succeed in this country, and what &t can doubt that the next 
world war, instead of being folIowed by a spread of fascism, will 
give birth to s new wave of proletarian revolutions that may well 
crack the capitalist system all over Europe? 
Thomas' new sectantananism has im roots in this basic @rnism, 
in his glaring lack of faith in the fighting ability of the working 
elm and i& allies. His whole conception is an escape from the hard 
realities md severe bsks of the &a struggle into the easy realm of 
glittering radical generalities. But it is a path that the working 
vffiil never tread. It will not fit itself into Thomas' narrow sectarian- 
ism, defeatism and crass opportunism. On the contary, it will forge 
ahead dong its line of militant mass struggle and leave the Socialist 
Party, if that Party prsists in its present policies, sitting in steriie 
isolation. 
In the foregoing pages we haw seen chat the SocizlIist Party, with 
its new turn, has not succeeded in develo$ng a policy that would 
bring it forward in a Ieading position among the workers and other 
soiling masses in their everyday struggle against the capimh ex- 
ploiters. Thus it still f a 3  in the Grst essential for the establishment 
of the c h  straggle policy that is fundarnentdy necessary in order 
to build a strong revolutionq party. Now let us see what the So- 
daIist Party is doing with regard to the wond essential of such a 
class struggle policy-the bu~Minp up of a strong body of Marxist- 
Leninist u n d e m d h g  in and around the Party. Here, again, as we' 
shall see, our question will receive a negative answer : the S o c i d t  
Party is also not succeeding in this most basic need. 
Prior to 1934, the authori~tive pronouncement of the Socklist 
Party analysis and policy wss the statement of principles adopted in 
I 
I the Party convention of 1924. Thip was a typical social reformist 
documen't of the period; it might well have &la the basic program 
of any of the parries of the Second International. It was more con- 
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; servativtivr even &an the 1920 statement (which was adopted undeiL 
-the inluene of the Russian Revolution and the great post-war up , 
heavals) and it contained alI the theoreticd misconceptions and ;I 
. opportunist policles &at have led to the pram'cal bankruptcy of the 
. .. 
Second International in the face of the Russian Revdution on the 
',-one h d  and the rise of f&SEi9m on the orher. A 
The 1924 Socialist Party statement, a product of the M i d g e  I 
"boom" priad, was not a progrm of proletarian revolution, but - 
- of the gradual growth of capitalism mto w c h l b .  The document ' . 
I I 
rejects the M a 6  analysis of the capitaliSt mtc as the instrument 
;I of the bourgeoisie and the revolutionary n e e  for setting up 
J thc dictatofthip of the prdcmd-bstead it is based upon the oppor- 
tunist theory that the prestnt state i a democratic d e ' s  Btate by 
means of which radrlirm w be builc The 1924 pr- a h  - 
holds forth not a Msndaa pe-ctive of c h  struggle. dminating- 
priatm'' without campensation, but the Bernsrein conception of c h  - . 
collaboration, the conquest of the state by peaceful means and tbe .: 
purehast of the major industries from the capitalist owners. 
The Detroit, 1934, statement of principles, written as I bsve , 
pinted out under the pressure of the great American strike wave 
of the early Roosevrlt years and in face of rhc bankruptcy of the 
German Socialist Party before Hitler's attacks, broke sharply with : . 
the extreme Right reformist S o d a b  Party conception of .1924. - 
The new program was still full of confusion and far from being 
revolutionary, but it was nevettheless a big advance over the pre- ,1 
1 &us document. I A 
1 The 1934 program rejected the reformist theory of the eaph 
I, talist "people's  stat^''^ began to sptak of the "bogus democrq of - 1  
- capitalism", and made a confused approach to the question of the. , I 
d i e t a ~ ~ ~ l i p  of the proletariat by vague theorizing abut  a future I 
"workers' demodracy". The program also cast grave doubts on the 
-! 
d c a c y  of purely democratic and legal methods o f  struggle and I 
declared that it was prepared if necessvg to "carry the revolutionary 
struggle into the camp of the enemy". It also took a more militant:. ,I  
stand against war, pronouncing itself in favor of "massed war re4 L 
sistance", and it made a more correct estimate of the first s o d k t  
state, the U.S.S.R. This relatively kf t program was adopted - 
the Detroit convention only after a f iem resistpncc by the "Oid4;: " 
-- Guard" leadership, who denounced it as Communistic. - 7  - '# 
5 7 - 1 .  
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The Detroit, 1934, program represented progress in the direc- 
tion of a revolutionary basis for the Socialist Party's work. But the 
Cleveland, 1936, Sacialisr Patty convention took some step bark- 
ward by subantially watering down the Detroit document. 
Throughout its history the Socidkt Party has opportunistidly 
swayed back and forth in its statements of its basic principles, varying 
them widely according to the temporary moods of the maas .  
The Party was at the time no longer feeling the heavy mass 
pressure &at it had experienced in 1934, so the 1936 Socialist 
Party convention, as always dominated by lawyers, preachers, doc- 
tors and other middle & intellectuals, who were alarmed at their 
own radicalism of 1934, characteristically decided to remove 
&me of the "objcctionable'' features of the 1934 program. 
They also hoped that this ' ' e o n ~ n "  would placate the enraged 
-&Old Guard" Right wing of the Parry led by Louis Waldman, Abe 
Cahan, James Oneal, then aa the verge of a split. 
Tbc Detroit convention had before it a proposed program sub- 
mitted by the Left wing at the Socialkt Call Institute, a document 
which, despite its many clemtntary theoretical errors, would have 
brought the So&& Parry substantially n m r  to a c m a  Leninist 
position.* Bur the convation rejected this document and, instead 
of continuing the Party's progress Lefmard, pushed it off again to 
the Right. The 1936 convention toned down the 1934 declaration 
of priacipks by modifying several key paragraphs in a manner con- 
siderably minimizing the necessity for a program of militant class 
4truggle surd placing more reliance upon bourgeois democracy. These 
retreats to the Right Norman Thomas calls an Uimprovement".** 
In considering the status of the Smiabt Party with regard to 
revolutionary theory attention must be focused u p  its leader, 
N o r m  Thomas. In reality, so great is his influence that the Party 
k guided far more by what he says than by its formal declaration 
of principles. And Thomas' whole theoretical Iine makes against a 
revolutionary program ; it worb directly count- to the development 
of a body of M d n  revolutionary understanding in and around 
the W s t  Party; it cultivates reformism and s e c ~ n i s m  and it 
creates favorable conditions for the growth of Trotskyism. 
* For a detailed analysh of thi document and aa &tc of &c p c d  
theoretical' *tion of the Socialk Party, e A l e x  Bitptlman'a pamphlet, 
Gomg b f t ,  Workers Libmry PubLisb~rq New York, 




The viewpoint of Norman Thomas is a melange of "Left" 
ilihcratism acd Bernstein revisionism, heavily tinctured with Trotsky- 
I 'ism, and this incongruous mixture he calls acsocklism". Thomas, the 
:present "Left" leader of the Socialist Party, is even Lxs a Mamist 
''than was the former K i  opportunist Old Guard party head, 
Hillquit. Not only is the basic theoretical work of the great Mamisrs, 
Lenin and Stalin, rejected completely by Thomas, but he aIso blithely 
-chdtnges offhand even the most fundamental principles of Manr 
land Engels. Thus, for cmmple, in a few lincs mnd with a wave of 
;the hand, he casually brushes aside the Marxian conceptions of 
,hisaorical materialism and of the dm struggle and a h  the Marxian 
,theories of value. 
. . &we thing do not prooc that all this old world nee& h 
to accept Marxiem with i~ materialist wimption of U r y ,  c h  
c o d i n  and &my of valwm 
I "Not only ie the ccllaccp: of ,f d&mniition tu 
the weight M d  often put u p n  it but so ia tbe mare w h a n d y  
restatement of the traditional reformist line of the Swialist Party, 
, with the addition of his new sectarian tendencies. It contradicts even 
the relatively mild "Left" line of the 1934 Party statement of 
principles. Thomas shows in it that the great lessons of the R d o  
Revolution, the rise of fascism a d  the bankruptcy of the oppor~unist 
fine of the Second International are quite lost upon him in the mamr 
of working out of a SOcjaliPt plicy in the United States. 
In Thomas' latest book we find a repetition of the old social 
ref ormist avoidance of mass class smggle and the customary appor- 
runkt conception of the gradual growth of capitalism into wdkm. 
He even repeats the antique and discredited reformist plan of buy- 
ing the industries from the capitah, as he propes "to offer some 
comptnsation to the expropriated owners".+* Thomas retains a child- 
like faith in the efficacy of capitalkt democracy as the means of 
accomplishing sodahm, He completely disregards the lessons of 
fascism in Europe, which prove mnclusively what Mam and L d  
said many yeam ago* that the capitalists, including the militant 
- 
* A&'s W q  O* pp. 133 and 138. 
** dftw h New D a L W M f  p. 163. 
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Am& brand, win never d a w  themselves to be ousted through 
the workeft and their d i c e  merely obtaining prliamcntarp majori- 
ties, but wiU resort to arms to defend their rulership, Thomas pins 
h i  hopes in the American a p h l i s t  democraq (with a bit of parch- 
mg up here and thtl*e). He is thus an ardent advocate of American 
exeeptimlism. Just how little a revolutionist Thomas is, despite all 
hia pother a h t  mchlism, was shown by a revealing statement he 
made in June, 1936, to The N m  YOTR Tiplod$: 
q n  this e~tmtry we want no dictatodip, wc want no revolution, 
&re are ample constitutiod mya of bringing about tbt change 
[to &dim-WZ.F.1 iu a pcaccfd and legal m ~ ~ e r . ~  
From all the foregoing it is clear that the Socialist Party, as a 
party, is not &g itself upon rcvoluhary thcorp; and as Lcnin 
smys, without revolutionary theory there ean be no revolutionary " 
movement. With its p m n t  hkl of conflicting group reformist 
t h e s l d  Guardism, militantism, Lovestoneism, and counter- 
, 
revoIutionary Trots-, the So&& Party does not develop a 
program of militant daiIy mas  struggle nor can it build up the in- . 
dispensable core of revolutionary Marxian fighters. What progress 
it is malting towards these e e n w  gods coma from the prem~t 
of the incipient LministSdinh minority in the Smiatist P q .  
Especially d o e  Thomzs' mish-mash of spporhtnist Lhcorizing staad 
in the way of the idcdogical advance of the W i s t  Party. T o  be- 
come a revolutionary party the Socialist Partp would have to over- 
come i~ sMow opportunkt theories and bm its policies firmly upon 
the study and ppph of the work of the great revolutionary 
leaders of the working -Marx, Engcls, Lcnin and Sun. 
A fundamental aspea of the fdurc of the new leadership of 
the Socia$t Party to cultivate the revolutionary force of the working 
cIass is its hostility towards the united front. In this and-united front 
attitude there arc  elements of the new S&&t Party s e c t a m ,  
but the main constituents of it are remnants of the traditional war 
of the opportunistic Socialist Parq leadership against the Left wing. 
The question of unity is now one of most burning necessity 
to the working h in view of the growkg offensive of the fascist 
reaction. At its recent Seventh WorId Congress in Mmow the 
Communise International understcad this clearly, saying: "At the 
present historical stage it is the main and immediate task of the in- 
trnational labor m o m e n t  to establish the uniocd front of the 
workiug k'' 
I The Communist Parties all over the world are working actively 
to develop such unity of labor's farces. And that they are not striving 
in vain is demonstrated by the great united front movemenrr in, 
France, Spain, Austria, Italy, ctc. In Brst h e ,  dl these movements 
are based upan formal united front agreements between the W i s t  
and Communist P& 
The need for unity within the ranks of MKU h also acute in the 
United States, and the Communist Party is the leading fighter for 
the united front. As part of its campaign for an eventual broad 
united People's Front of labor and its allies in the Farmer-Labor 
Party it attadtts great importance to a general united front with 
the Sociakt Party, based upon a program of struggle for immediate 
demands, but also looking forward to rhe amalgamatian of the two 
partus into one organization on the basis of a rcvdutionq fight 
for & l h .  
Notwithstanding that the united front question played a big 
role in the recent deieat of the "Old Guard" leadership the present 
Socialist Party leaders, however, resist tbe striving of &c &u- 
nist Party for a general united front. Thus they rejected the Com- 
munist P a r =  p r o p ~ ~ l  for a joint  communist Party ticket 
in the 1936 national elections, Harking back to the traditional 
Socialist Party owrtunist p o l i i  of war against the Left md con- 
ciliation towards the Right, they work on the theory that joint action 
with the Commuaists is a hindrance rather h an advantage. They 
only go as far in the direction of the united front as they are p r e d  
by their rank and fik among whom the Communist Party 
united f ronr policy is very popular. The official SociaIiPt Party stand is 
against a general united front with the Communist Parry, but it 
does d n a l I y  accept united front d o n s  on individual hues. 
O n  such questions as the Socialist Parrg and Communist Party 
have developed united front dons, including the amalgamation of 
the two unemployed organizations .into the Workers Alliance, the 
defense of the Mwney, Sc-fo and Herndon ascs, joint Socialist 
Party-Communise Partg -'on in various Imiw, l d  mass demon- 
strations, etc., have h e n  almwit uniformly highly successfd The 
workers joy fully supported the unity in action of the two organiza- 
tions, and the whole experience to date has gone to show that broad 
united front activities by the two parties on a sound program couId 
be a powerful factor for progress in the labor movement. 
But Norman Thomas, with eyes Right, wants little or none of 
that, In his latest book he says: 
"Our fandamentar ta& is not to unite Maliaeq C o m m h  and 
what we EOU p-v- M y  nruncrom enough ta ~ o p  faaeism, 
i nanemt i - fd bk  W of ns tDgc tbuapc , s l aq tmfe~ .~*  
With such characteristic canfusionist arguments does Thomas 
justify his appwtunist re jcEtion of the united front and place okacles 
in the way of labor's unity. In one breath he admits that the pros- 
pective united front forces are "alrcady numerous enough to stop 
fascism" b d  then, in the very next breath, he bemoans that "All of 
us tagether are, a h ,  too f ewi'. 
Negative resuits of this Socialist Party mti-unitp line are to be 
seen in various front movemen- iacIudiDg the Farmer-Labor 
Partg, the National Negro Congress, the N a W  Youth Congress, 
and the American League Against War and Fascism. In these move- 
mene the S o d a h  Pa* &cy (save in the casc of individual !b 
cialisb who disregard thcir Party's line) boils down prmp much to 
one of mere fault-finding, scetarirrn prop& and even a d  ob- 
slr~ction, The anti-united front tendencies in the Socialist Party arc 
being saengthencd by the growing influence of the counter-revolu- 
tionarv Tro&vitcs. 
%mag &ho iP SO cimsemtivc on the united front crucstian in 
the United states, puddedy becomes super-radical on the &ted front 
internationally, which is only anothcr way of o@g this $icy. 
A la Trow, he is much alarmed that the PopuIar Front move- 
ments in Fmce and Spnrin are not revolutionary enough and he 
criticizes them for Righi opportunism. Thus, characteristically, at a 
big New York united front demonmation the k i d k t  Party, in 
the namt of vague prop& for a workers' Spain, not o d y  refused 
spe&dly to endorst the S p i s h  People's Front government, which 
was fighting guns in hand against fascism, but even tried to force 
the Communist Party to agree not to W~JT slagam or make speeches 
bearing such endorrerncnts. But Thomas' narrow sectarian conccp 
tion of the People's Front, a'fohwed in Europe, could only have the 
effect of surrendtntng to the fascism the farmers and city middle 
dass elements now in the Popular Front, for which dedsive gift 
the f d  would rejoice. The Populgr Front movement, dtspitc iw 
many weakn- as yet in practice, is sound in principle. It is the 
correct revoIutionary strategy in the given situation. It is the path 
by whieh the anti-fascist masses can deveIap M y  the greatcat 
possible struggle here and now, and it is a h  the strate@ means 
by which thc proletariat can gather around itself the maximum 
forces for the eventual tlvolutionarp overthrow of the capitalist 
system. It is giving new revolutionary hope, organidon snd fighting 
spirit to the m a  demoralized by the ideological bdmptcy of the 
Second Internationd. 
T h e  Socialist Party's openly opportunist r&mmcc to the united 
'front policy in the United States and its se&, but no lm oppox- 
tunkt, attempt to narrow down the People's Front in Europe is a h e  
relation of thE "Old Guard's'' mti-united froat policy, and it is in 
line kith that of the most reformist r& of the Setond Interna- 
tional. It demonstrates that the Socialist Party has not yet learned 
how to develop the revolutionq farces, its new leadership not having 
vanquished the reformist hang-overs from the past in this fun&- 
m e n d  respect. The anti-united front tendencies in the &idkt 
Parry are a red barrier to its becoming a strong mass party and a 
leading fighting force. 
In a previous chapter I bye &wn that one of the most f a d  
mistakes in the whole hktory of the Sadeliw Party, one that under- 
miard the Party from within and alienated &e bst r e v o I u t i o ~  
elements from without, was its yeamlong attitude of h&ty towards 
1 .  
the U.S.S.R. The bitter struggle tbat the S& Party "Old Guard'' 
, 
petty-bourgeois leaders so long Icd against the first &&st country 
' 
was a basic expression of their general war against the Left wing 
in their own Party and against every other manifmtation of rwdu- 
I tionary spirit and program. 
The Sociakt Partp of t&yI despite its new turn, has not freed 
imlf from this fundamental error. Such anqonisRl to the U.S.S.R. 
I is, in find analysis, antagonism to p r o l e t a h  revolution in general. 
Although its rankad-file membefship are IriendIy to the 
Soviet Union, there still remains much of the old reformist and- 
Sovietism in the official policy of the Socialist Pa-. The SocirJirt Cdi, 
fw example, has long been a happy hunting ground for renegades 
like Zam, the Trotskyites and various other professional slanderers 
of the U.S.S.R. Their lies are cut from the same cloth as those af 
H~arst and Green, but often outdo the latter in insidious mis- 
representation. 
Norman Thomas, the decisive leader of the Socialist Party, is 
especially to be criticized for his unfriendliness towards the Soviet 
Union. His attitude regarding the U.S.S.R. or "Russia", as he calls 
it in bourgeois fashion, is about I per cent grudging endorsement 
and 99 per cent cynical criticism. It is not to be expected, of 
course, that a reformist Socialist should accept uncritically the Soviet 
government and is program, but he certainly should appraise it fairly 
and honestly, and this Thomas does not do. The US.S.R. has always 
welcomed sincere criticism, an example of this being the warm 
greeting it gave to the recent splendid boolr by the Webbs, S o t k t  
C o d :  A hrew Ckdhio~rP, which contains no little, honest 
but mistaken, criticism of the Soviet system. 
Thomas approaches the question of the Soviet government from 
a biased, antagonistic standpoint. Its gigantic achievements politically, 
industrially, socially leave him cold and supeisridcal. He sneers at 
the warm and loyal defense Communists make of the fim & a b  
country, the great world stronghold against fascism, when he wys, 
"Russia is a kind of holy h d  to all Communists".* He ha never 
taken the trouble to visit the U.S.S.R. (although thousands of Amer- 
icans have done SO) to study the situation at first hand. Whenever 
he writes about the Soviet Union Thomas reflects in his own special 
way whatever anti-Soviet slanders happen to be afloat at the time, 
Almost any liberal bourgeois writer can be depended upon to make 
a fairer and more objective estimate than he of the Soviet Union. 
In these crucial days of threatening war danger, with the Soviet 
Union menaced from both east and west by strong and ruthless 
fasckr powers, it is the duty and interest of every revolutionist to 
draw cIoser to the U.S.S.R. and to give the r n d  active support to its 
peace policy. But Normm Thomas, typically, has not the slightest 
sense of any such need. On the contrary, he seems to consider that 
now, when the U.S.S.R. is so heavily attacked, i the best time to 
go w i g  against it. His slanderow miwepresentation of tbe Soviet 
Union during the Ethiopian war was a scandal. His reception of 
the great new Soviet Codt~t ion  was frigid and skept icah new 
caphdh charter for New York City would evoke more enthusiasm 
and faker consideration from him. His reaction to the case of the 
TrowZinoviev terrorism was to put the Soviet government, not 
t h a  murderers, on trial. And so it goes on every Soviet question, 
always Thomas ts to be found &*ng doubts and insinuations upan 
the good faith of the Soviet government. He could gulp down with- 
out blinking the treacherous MaDonald and Bindenburg govern- 
ments, but the revolutionary U.S.S.R. government can do nothing 
to suit him. h d ,  as we have seen earlier, in his demand that '"Russia" 
stand alone +st its enemies and not dl upon rhe workers of 
&r countries for activc &ce, he i threatening to abandon the 
Soviet government altogether in case of war. 
The revolutionary stam of a party can be measured by its 
attitude towards the U.S.S.R. This is bemuse the Soviet government 
is the revdution in life, the crpdbtion in flesh and blood of re- 
Zutionq theory and practice. The anti-Soviet tendencies in the 
leadership of the Soeirrlist Party are expressions of the reformism 
with which the Party is dicttd. They are diluted "Old Guardism", 
remnants of the traditional opportunk war +st the Left wing, 
and they are dangtroudy akin to Hearst's Sovietphobia. They sum 
up as part of the Socialist Party's gene& failure to cultivate and 
organize thc revolutioIuvg form. 
It is high time that the Socialist Party put an end m these anti- 
revdutionllrg trends. They have dom incalculable harm to the So- 
L P w  ever since the November, 1917, revolution and they 
t still continue to work their e d  dm. The Socialist Party can never be on a sound m a s  basia until its leaders stop sniping at the U.S.S.R. ; it can never become a revolutionary party until it gives, srs a Paw, ro the Soviet government and b struggle for pee that heartg support which springs sponhneowly in dl rcvoIutiolwy parties and which we& up nawally in the h e m  of every revolutionary worker. T h  P&spectiv4 of $he So&dir$ Par@ I Now let us see to what general conelusions our analysis of the hhory and present situarion of the S o d a h  Party has led us. Firstly, we have seen in Chapter I that the .basic reason why the 
SoEialist Party has not succeeded historically in building i d f  inta a 
strong mass revoIutionary prty is bemuse it bas followed a poliey i 
of reformism instead of one of Marsian dags struggle. We have : 
also seed that this opportunist linc originated with the petty-bourgeois 
intellectuaIs who dominated the S h I i s t  Party and systematically 
tried to make of it some kind of a ~emi-demi-progrcasive patty. 
Then, in Cbaptcn XI and XI, we have sten concretely bow the . 
Socialist Pslrtg, in the W - o d d  years prior to the development of 
its new Left turn iu 1934, had continuody violated both major 
essentials of the necessary &is struggle policy: ( a )  by its fdme to 
corns forward militantly as the leader of the toiling masses in their 
dady emnomic and political q g k s ,  and, (b) by its faiiure to build 
up a solid body of Mamian understanding in the Socialist Party and 
among its uma following. And we have also seen how, step by step, 
this persistent reformist plicy prevented the Sodalist Party from . 
growing and gaining broad mass influence and how it finally led 
to several splits and to the deep decay which the Party suffered for 
ten ycarsprior to 1934. 
Now, in Chapter IV, we have just checked owr the present gen- . 
era1 line and condition of the Swialist Party to learn whether, since 
its 1934 turn Leftwards, the Party hasovercome the reformist errors . 
of its past and has hid the basis for a m u d  M-an policy of dass 
struggle, And the conclusion we are compelled to arrive at is a ' 
negative one. The old disease of opportunism still the Socialist 
Party, although it has taken on some new sectarian forms. 
T o  begin with, the prtscnt day SociaIist Party has not succeeded 
in proletarianizing its leadership, dth~ugh it has freed imlf of many 
opportunist doctors, lawyers, profemrs, etc., in the "Old Guard" 
split. As since its beginning, the Social& Party leadership remains in 
the hands of the petty-bourgeois intellechmk And the general ten- 
dency of these &cials goes to thwart the revolutions ry p u r e  of 
the proletarians in the Party and to keep the Party on a reformist 
course, masked by revolutionary ~hrasemaking and Trotskyist coun- 
tersvolutionary mmtuverings. 
We have a h  seen in the present chapter how the present So- 
cialist Party leademhip still violates the two major essentials of the 
indispensable Mamian class struggle policy. Firstly, by its perpetuation 
of old reformist hang-ovtrs and the introduction of the new sec- 
tarian opportunism, illustrated through its grossly wrong attitude on 
66 I 
tbe q l l c ~ h  of thc relation of the fight for imme&& demands to 
dght for socialism, its defeatist attitude in the struggle a g a h  fascism 
and war, i@ anti-Labor Party plicy, ttc., this leadcrshi prevents 
the Socklist Party from coming forward in a leading role in the 
d d p  st~uggle~ of the workers and thus condemns the Party 
' to blatbn and impotence; and, secondly, by its grw neglect, rc- 
' 
visionism, and antagonkin towards the theoretid works of Man, 
Engels, Lenin and Stalin, by its M t y  to the united front policy, 
by its ~01~~0l idat iOn wkh the discredited T r o w  dhpters ,  and 
by its unfriindlineas towards the Soviet Union, the SoJalist Party 
leadership binders the growth of the class conscious body of rewlu- ! tIonarg fighters without whom the S a d k  Party a n  never succeed. 
The general consequence of this fdure of the new Socialist 
., Party leademhip to comet the M o n a l  and d k & o u  reformiet 
;' liac of the Party h a  hen,  inseead of liquidating che Partg crisis, to 
, intensify it, especlalIy during the pt year. The !hdh Party is very 
dct from opporhulim and T h d  new t'curcn t as bad as the old 
' h : indeed it is only tbt chronic ailment of reformism manifdng 
itself through new symptom. Thc Sodalist P q  d s k  spreads, 
dacpens and becomes more threatening. The Party membership ia 
r a g y  d&ng, now being probably not more than half of the 
19,121 tbat it was Iast pear. The "OId Gwd" split has wrought 
h a m  with the Party organhion in Ohio, I n k ,  California, 
' Washiugton, Oregon, New York, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, ctc., 
and the Pw is threatening to colIapse in many other l d t i e s .  
The effects of the split are made worse by Thomas' silly aeetatian 
palicks and the anti-revolutionarp work of the Trotskyist eIements, 
. all 6f which drive away many serious and honest workers, The 
. 
$xidist Party is torn with factionalism, with half a dozen group 
struggling for leadership; the Party is deeply confused theoretidy; 
5. dkjpline is practically non-existent; pesimism is rampt ,  and thm is 
i a general falling away of members who are d&grunded and dis- @wed. Naturally also, the maas hflutnce of the Sociakt Party has rapidly waned; its 1936 election vote will be greatly reduced md, a c m e ,  in the trade union$ even those led by bdh for many years, it bas been almm wiped out.* In short, the Socialist Party -** A typm example: In the LL.G.W.U, Locd 22, New YO& d t b  30,000 membtrq a d t i o n d p  hidk Party controlled d o n ,  the bdah -ahti-LaborPattypoZicyw~rtj&byavotthhrptio of 15 to 1. 
most serious Crhk 
is now, as the fruit of its long-eontinutd oppammh policies, in a 
Now as to the future: Is the Sockkt  Party on the way to col- 
lapse, or b it within it the possiy of a r e ~ h a n c e  and growth 
into s strong party of real value in devclophg the fighting fore of 
the proletariat and its allies? T o  this query the only answer that can 
correctly be given at  present is that both positive and negative factors 
are at work in shaping the Socialist Party and that the  fate of the 
Party depends upon which of these forces becomes definitely 
dominant. 
Among the positive faaon-that is, those making for a strong 
and revolutionary Socialist Party--the most basic one is the constant 
pressure npon the Socialist Party from the mdidzarion of the 
masses of workers. Faced by the surging capidkt reaction which in- 
creasingly tends in the direction of fascism, these masses, hatlrssed by 
unemployment, low wages, abridged civil rights, ctc., are compelled 
to fight. Hence, they press militantly upon the trade unions, the 
growing Farmer-Labor P q ,  and aIl other labor orgmimtims, in 
order to utilize these Mies as fighting w e a n s  in their growing 
struggle against thc capitalist exploiters. It was this mass pressure, 
in first line, that brought about the Leftward trend in the Socialist: 
Party, with its defeat of the "Old Guard", adoption of the Detroit, 
1934, declaration of principles, ttc., and it is this force which, in 
opposition to the present t p d  of the Socialist Party leadership, pr* 
vides the general basis for the defeat of sectarian reformism and 
Trotskyism in the S o & h  Party. 
Dovetailing with th constmCtiye force are the effects, on the 
one hand, of the open bankruptcy of the ref ormist, elass collabora- 
tion policy of the whole Second International in the face of rising 
fascism and, on the other hand, of the gseat successes, domestic and 
foreign, of the Socialist Soviet Union, the growth of the Popular 
Front movements in Spain, France, and the general united front 
palicy of the Communist Internationd-11 of which developments 
tend to press the Sodist Party in the direction of a policy of M h  
class struggle. 
Another major @tive force making for a fighting Socialist 
Party is the revolutionary example and stimulation of the Communist 
Party. The C.P.U.S.A. manifestly has every reason to want the 
!bcdist Party to dewlop in a revoIutionary sense, for this means 
greatly to increase the power of both parties and to draw them 
clwr together. Therefore, the Communist Party cooperates with 
the Socialist Party wherever psible, meanwhile making and receiving 
d d s m  in a friendly spirit. T h e  Communist Party does what it mn 
to sbcngthen the Leninist bent. within .the Wt Party; it 
seizes upon eve y practical occasion to initiate joint united front cam- 
paigns of the two parties and other labor groups; its whole porky 
looh forward to the eventual amalgamati011 of the Communist 
Pilrtg and S d i s t  Party into one party upon the bask of a Leninist 
revdutiona ry program, 
But there are also at work powerful negative forces that check 
- thew constructive e1ements and tend to push the Socialist Party 
I deeper into the quicksand of oppormnb. Among these negative 
' forces is the important fact that the Socdist Party has not succeeded 
' in prolemrianizing its leadership. At the Pattg's head, as of yore, 
t smds a group of opportunist petty-bourgeois intellectuals. These 
elements act as s real M e r  to the manslation of the revolutiomy 
m o d  of the S o d k t  Party's proletarian members into terms of a 
M d - M i n i s t  p l i c y  fop rhc Party. 
Next there is the negative force of the traditional reformist line 
- of the Socialkt Party. The dfftrucdve oppotunist policies which, as 
we have seen in detail, have through the course of the years brought 
the Socialist Party to the bnirk of ruin, sti l l  remain basidly h effect. 
, 
Their new seetarisn trimm'mgs by no means mitigate their disastrous 
consequences upon the Party. 
And then there i9 that new mahgnant disease of the Socialist 
Party, the plague of Trotskpism. The admission of the counter- 
revolutionary Trotskyites was an injection of deadly poison into rhe 
life tissues of tbe Socialist P q .  They are not only wotsenmg every 
traditional weakness of the Party but are ia~odudng a whole series 
of new difficulties for it. 
Of rhese posl0tive and negative farces, of which f have cited only 
those of a major charattcr, it must be admitted that the negative 
I ones are now in the ascendant. Corroding and destructive, they are rapdy isolating the Socialist Party from the masses and disintegrating its organization. It is certain tbat with iss present leadership and the S o d k t  Party is on the way to impotence. Unless both arc &ngcd, unless the forces that produced the 1934 Left turn md overthrew tho "Old Guard" can go forward to their necessary 
goal by giving the Socialist Party a revolutionary leadership and 1 
policy, the Socialist Parzp's dxpg as an important factarcin tbt labor ' j 
movement are over. In their time both the S o d k t  L JOT Party and ; the Indusuial Workers of the World were militant organi&ms - 
that played a progressive mlc in the developing revolutionary move- i 
ment. But they failed to learn the Iessons of the class struggle of 
their period and did not adapt themselves m the c h g i n g  fighting - 1 
needs of the workers. So they became isolated from the advancing * 
ml#iscs and fell into de&e and seaarian mummification. b the 
Socialist Party dmmed to travel the same f a t d  path? 
A Midmum Pam#kk# Ubrary of 
TEN MARXIST CLASSICS 
a 
A grw# sf tm of th wt basic tbmwdhd panpMdt~ 
wnWtem by swt kodm a d  twh, W x ,  &gels, 
W d S s s U l r  
. . .  I. Wage Labor and Capital, by Karl Marx .I0 
. . . .  2. Value, Price and Profit, by garl Manc .I5 
3. Th Communist Manifests, by Marx and Engels , .05 
4. SoEIaliam, Utopian and Scientific, by Friadrieh 
E n p l a . .  . . . . . . . * . . . . . .  .I5 
5. Imperialism, by V. I. Lenia . . . . . . . .  .80 
6. UMt-Wing"~ Communism: An Infantile Disorder, 
byV. L Letun . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .Z6 
7. Foundation6 o f  M e m ,  by Jmph Stslh . . .  .I@ 
8. State and RePoItltfon, by V. L LePia . . . . .  .lo 
9. Problem of Leninism, by Joseph S t a b .  . . .  .85 
10. The Program of the Communist International . .  .TO 
/ 
- 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  TOTAL $1.66 
Urder f r m  v r  boobbe# w f 
WORKERS LlBRARY PUBLISIIERS 
P. 0. Box 148, Sta. D New Y d  City 
L 
. . ' q-.-  ,* ' 
* .  
-r 2f 75 k c @  Way 
b t w t a & . c h 8 u w t  
h#& $1: w-rc 
m m  rlr SL 
-mi%-* 
c I . I J r r i I W ~ d u m  
C ) r # l . r  aoo. .IF# V u  lhrr 
915s v- R h k h  st. . 
Is26 w sltl 
N-I& mB. . r l l t iW 
-* 1u - T- 
